How Pakistan Is Countering the Taliban By HUSAIN HAQQANI
Wall Street Journal
APRIL 29, 2009
How Pakistan Is Countering the Taliban
The pacification model that worked in Iraq can work in the Swat Valley.
By HUSAIN HAQQANI
The specter of extremist Taliban taking over a nuclear-armed Pakistan is not
only a gross exaggeration, it could also lead to misguided policy
prescriptions from Pakistan's allies, including our friends in Washington.
Pakistan and the international community do face serious challenges in
confronting terrorists and the ideologies that sustain them. But panicked
reactions of the type witnessed in the U.S. media over the last few weeks --
after the Taliban drove into Buner, a town 60 miles north of the capital
Islamabad -- are not conducive to strengthening Pakistani democracy or to
developing an effective counterterrorism policy for Pakistan.
Now that the Taliban have been driven out of Buner, and Pakistani forces
have militarily engaged them just outside their Swat Valley stronghold, it
should be clear to all that Pakistan can and will defeat the Taliban.
In the free elections that returned Pakistan to democracy in February 2008,
Pakistanis overwhelmingly rejected Taliban sympathizers and advocates of
extremist Islamist ideologies. But the legacy of dictatorship, including a
tolerance for some militant groups, has proven tough to erase. Anti-American
rhetoric and Pakistan's traditional security concerns about its neighbors
have also dampened popular enthusiasm for strong military action against
violent extremists, even though President Asif Zardari has repeatedly
declared the war against them a war for Pakistan's soul.
Meanwhile, the change of administration in the U.S. has slowed the flow of
assistance to Pakistan. Unfortunately, ordinary Pakistanis have begun to
wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.
Under the Musharraf dictatorship, Pakistan probably was not as quick as it
needed to be to comprehend the enormity of the Taliban threat. And after
last year's election of democratic leaders, our new government had an array
of domestic issues to address. Mobilizing all elements of national power,
particularly public opinion, against the Taliban threat took time because
many Pakistanis thought the Taliban were amenable to negotiations and would
keep their word.
Recent developments offer us an opportunity amid crisis. More Pakistanis are
now convinced of the need to confront the extremists.
The recent spike of international concern about the threat in Pakistan seems
to stem from the recent dialogue between the government of the Pashtunkhwa
Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan and a local movement that supported
Islamic law but did not join the Taliban's violent campaign. The goal for
this dialogue was twofold -- first, to restore order and stability to the
Swat Valley; and second, to wedge rational elements of the religiously
conservative population away from terrorists and fanatics.
The model here was the successful pacification of Fallujah in Iraq, where
agreements with more moderate elements broke them away from al Qaeda
nihilists. The model worked so well in Fallujah that it is now being
resurrected by the American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The goal in
Pakistan's Swat Valley was the same.
The dialogue in Swat resulted in an agreement that would allow for elements
of Shariah to be applied to the judicial system of the Valley, as it has at
other times in our nation's history. This agreement demanded that the native
Taliban put down their weapons, pledge nonviolence, and accept the writ of
the state. It was a local solution for what some in Pakistan viewed as a
local problem.
Let me be perfectly clear here: Pakistan's civil and military leadership
understands that al Qaeda and its allies are not potential negotiating
partners. But, as the U.S. did in Iraq, Pakistan sought to distinguish
between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements within an expanding
insurgency.
The premise of the dialogue was peace. Without peace there is no agreement,
and without an agreement the Pakistani government will use all power at its
disposal to restore order in the Valley. We'd rather negotiate than fight.
But if we have to fight we will -- and we will fight to win.
What does Pakistan need to contain this threat? In the short term we need
the U.S. to share modern technology in antiterrorist engagement. Pakistan
needs night-vision equipment, jammers that can knock out FM radio
transmissions by the terrorists, and a larger, modernized fleet of
helicopter gunships for ground support in the massive sweeps that are
necessary to contain, repel and destroy the enemy.
Yet Washington has been reluctant to share this modern equipment, and to
train our military in antiterrorism techniques, because of concerns that
these systems could be used against India. Such concerns are misplaced.
Pakistanis understand that the primary threat to our homeland today is not
from our neighbor to the east but from the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) on our border with Afghanistan. To meet this threat, we must be
provided the means to fight the terrorists while we work on resuming our
composite dialogue with India.
In the long term, Pakistan's security will be predicated on Pakistan's
economic viability. That is the central thrust of the Kerry-Lugar
legislation currently before Congress, which would establish a 10-year,
multibillion dollar commitment to Pakistan's economic and social system. It
is also manifest in the Regional Opportunity Zone legislation currently
before Congress that would open U.S. markets to products manufactured in
Afghanistan and Pakistan's FATA region. An economically prosperous Pakistan
will be less susceptible to the ideology of international terrorism -- and
it will become a model to a billion Muslims across the world that Islam and
modernity under democracy are not only compatible, but can thrive together.
Mr. Haqqani is Pakistan's ambassador to the United States.
APRIL 29, 2009
How Pakistan Is Countering the Taliban
The pacification model that worked in Iraq can work in the Swat Valley.
By HUSAIN HAQQANI
The specter of extremist Taliban taking over a nuclear-armed Pakistan is not
only a gross exaggeration, it could also lead to misguided policy
prescriptions from Pakistan's allies, including our friends in Washington.
Pakistan and the international community do face serious challenges in
confronting terrorists and the ideologies that sustain them. But panicked
reactions of the type witnessed in the U.S. media over the last few weeks --
after the Taliban drove into Buner, a town 60 miles north of the capital
Islamabad -- are not conducive to strengthening Pakistani democracy or to
developing an effective counterterrorism policy for Pakistan.
Now that the Taliban have been driven out of Buner, and Pakistani forces
have militarily engaged them just outside their Swat Valley stronghold, it
should be clear to all that Pakistan can and will defeat the Taliban.
In the free elections that returned Pakistan to democracy in February 2008,
Pakistanis overwhelmingly rejected Taliban sympathizers and advocates of
extremist Islamist ideologies. But the legacy of dictatorship, including a
tolerance for some militant groups, has proven tough to erase. Anti-American
rhetoric and Pakistan's traditional security concerns about its neighbors
have also dampened popular enthusiasm for strong military action against
violent extremists, even though President Asif Zardari has repeatedly
declared the war against them a war for Pakistan's soul.
Meanwhile, the change of administration in the U.S. has slowed the flow of
assistance to Pakistan. Unfortunately, ordinary Pakistanis have begun to
wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.
Under the Musharraf dictatorship, Pakistan probably was not as quick as it
needed to be to comprehend the enormity of the Taliban threat. And after
last year's election of democratic leaders, our new government had an array
of domestic issues to address. Mobilizing all elements of national power,
particularly public opinion, against the Taliban threat took time because
many Pakistanis thought the Taliban were amenable to negotiations and would
keep their word.
Recent developments offer us an opportunity amid crisis. More Pakistanis are
now convinced of the need to confront the extremists.
The recent spike of international concern about the threat in Pakistan seems
to stem from the recent dialogue between the government of the Pashtunkhwa
Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan and a local movement that supported
Islamic law but did not join the Taliban's violent campaign. The goal for
this dialogue was twofold -- first, to restore order and stability to the
Swat Valley; and second, to wedge rational elements of the religiously
conservative population away from terrorists and fanatics.
The model here was the successful pacification of Fallujah in Iraq, where
agreements with more moderate elements broke them away from al Qaeda
nihilists. The model worked so well in Fallujah that it is now being
resurrected by the American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The goal in
Pakistan's Swat Valley was the same.
The dialogue in Swat resulted in an agreement that would allow for elements
of Shariah to be applied to the judicial system of the Valley, as it has at
other times in our nation's history. This agreement demanded that the native
Taliban put down their weapons, pledge nonviolence, and accept the writ of
the state. It was a local solution for what some in Pakistan viewed as a
local problem.
Let me be perfectly clear here: Pakistan's civil and military leadership
understands that al Qaeda and its allies are not potential negotiating
partners. But, as the U.S. did in Iraq, Pakistan sought to distinguish
between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements within an expanding
insurgency.
The premise of the dialogue was peace. Without peace there is no agreement,
and without an agreement the Pakistani government will use all power at its
disposal to restore order in the Valley. We'd rather negotiate than fight.
But if we have to fight we will -- and we will fight to win.
What does Pakistan need to contain this threat? In the short term we need
the U.S. to share modern technology in antiterrorist engagement. Pakistan
needs night-vision equipment, jammers that can knock out FM radio
transmissions by the terrorists, and a larger, modernized fleet of
helicopter gunships for ground support in the massive sweeps that are
necessary to contain, repel and destroy the enemy.
Yet Washington has been reluctant to share this modern equipment, and to
train our military in antiterrorism techniques, because of concerns that
these systems could be used against India. Such concerns are misplaced.
Pakistanis understand that the primary threat to our homeland today is not
from our neighbor to the east but from the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) on our border with Afghanistan. To meet this threat, we must be
provided the means to fight the terrorists while we work on resuming our
composite dialogue with India.
In the long term, Pakistan's security will be predicated on Pakistan's
economic viability. That is the central thrust of the Kerry-Lugar
legislation currently before Congress, which would establish a 10-year,
multibillion dollar commitment to Pakistan's economic and social system. It
is also manifest in the Regional Opportunity Zone legislation currently
before Congress that would open U.S. markets to products manufactured in
Afghanistan and Pakistan's FATA region. An economically prosperous Pakistan
will be less susceptible to the ideology of international terrorism -- and
it will become a model to a billion Muslims across the world that Islam and
modernity under democracy are not only compatible, but can thrive together.
Mr. Haqqani is Pakistan's ambassador to the United States.
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