Power Play in Pakistan - Analysis and Consequences

On recent political developments, I would not waste my time on dealing with the principled arguments, for post mid-night GHQ meeting, the Jeddah dealers (who happened to be convicts as well) had taken the highest moral ground in opposing NRO (a law for mere accused). Neither am I going to ponder on the dichotomy that the biggest beneficiary of NRO, MQM has become its principled opposition. For in power play, talk of principles is waste of time.
The realistic analysis thus should revolve around the following questions:
• Why Army wants Asif Ali Zardari out?
• In this battle of Army (Establishment) vs. PPP, will army succeed in ousting Asif Ali Zardari?
• What are the options that Army has, and how practical they are?
• What are the options of Asif Ali Zardari?
• What will be the consequences if establishment succeeds? What will be the consequences if it fails?
I think the reason to oust Zardari can be traced back to PPP’s confrontation with Army on issues like India policy, Kerry Lugar Bill, civilian control over ISI, difference of opinion on good Taliban vs. Bad Taliban doctrine of national security establishment, and difference of opinion on permanent settlement of Afghan issue. More importantly, there is a genuine fear on part of elements in Army that if the current process is allowed to get unchecked, it will close the doors for a military intervention forever because of public mood against military intervention and commitment of international powers for a democracy in Pakistan.
Asif Ali Zardari has been continuously under attack by his opponents led by Army. Starting from Long March, when Army’s support seemed covert (though civilian bureaucracy’s was overt) to Kerry Lugar Bill and now NRO, it seems the design to undermine the reemergence of PPP to the helm of affairs in Pakistan through the Frankenstein of judiciary is well on its way. The only difference is that this time the PPP’s rise is backed by a wave of a massive international support coupled with her large vote bank.
Till now the establishment has succeeded in undermining PPP on at least two occasions, one on the issue of restoration of judges and the other on NRO. On the contrary, in the greater scheme of things, PPP’s wins have been securing all key political posts and a victory on Kerry Lugar Bill issue.
Establishment, led by Army, in this battle has been organized and is in full control of mass media. On the other hand, PPP seems to have her share of gaffes when it comes to managing the issues of on-going power play. First it erred in not having a comprehensive plan to tackle the post-Governer Raj situation in Punjab. You cannot plan on stopping long march while having Shahbaz Sharif’s loyal bureaucracy in place. It seems the docile, all-compromising nature of Prime Minister Gillani was to be blamed for it. Another failure came on media management front. If you plan on surviving in a hostile power game, you cannot do it with Fauzia Wahab as your media manager. Even bigger folly came in taking the support of allies for granted on KLB and NRO, without realizing their close relationship with the establishment.
From where things are, Asif Ali Zardari seems under considerable pressure. But for now, he cannot be taken out through any constitutional process, for 2/3 majority in parliament is not there to impeach him and because of immunity he enjoys being the president; he cannot be removed through courts even if NRO is set aside by the courts. Army’s best bet is to pressurize him, force his closest team members out through courts, and in the process hope that a larger chunk of PPP MPs breakaway.
Army’s another problem is that if PPP is ousted; no coalition can be formed without combining Q and N factions of PML. This arrangement will be hard to negotiate. Army will be hoping on a breakaway in the PPP led by PM Gillani for its plan to fall in place. Army’s biggest advantage is that it has shown beyond doubt that it still controls enough political parties in Pakistan to turn a government with comfortable majority into a minority government. Another thing on which Army is banking is that in the present regional situation, US and Western powers will overlook any political adventure on part of Army because of their reliance on it. We analyze this in detail below.
For Asif Zardari, he still holds card of PPP vote bank and his strong support in Sindh. He will also be banking on support from Western powers. The biggest variable, yet unknown for its silent style of diplomacy, is China. How far will China go to extend support to any post-Zardari government and how clear it signals her role in post-Zardari Pakistan will be a key piece to solve the political puzzle of Pakistan. Same goes for United States. Pakistani establishment’s calculation is that America wants to cut-and-run from Afghanistan, just as they did in Iraq. This assertion to me seems flawed on two accounts. First, a deep analysis of Americans withdrawal plans from Iraq clearly indicate that US is not leaving Iraq for foreseeable future and second, it is not showing any signs of disengagement from Afghanistan to the extent it is disengaging from Iraq. Also, any quick disengagement from Afghanistan will be preceded by something on the lines of Joe Biden’s Pakistan first doctrine where drone attacks on Quetta etc are highly likely. Pakistani establishment’s calculation is that because of its inevitability, US will accept its actions. Now whether US is willing to revert to a policy of 90s, leaving Af-Pak to Pakistani and Saudi security apparatus, is yet to be seen. One thing that can be said for sure is that positions US and China take will play very heavy on the eventual outcome of this conflict. But above all, Asif Zardari’s survival will depend on his ability to mobilize a resistance in the event of his ouster and how well he displays the potential resistance at his ouster to his opponents.
If the present setup falls, Pakistan is likely to head into a period of extensive political instability. The length of this period will depend on the relationship between Q and N and the success of establishment in tearing apart PPP’s parliamentary party. It will also depend on the response of Mr. Zardari and PPP workers to any such act. Moreover, removal of Mr. Zardari is likely to lead to a major policy shift in war on terror where the distinction between good and bad Taliban will be back and will lead to a resurgence of religious extremism under government’s patronage carried out by good Taliban. Ouster of Mr. Zardari also has a potential of increasing Pakistan’s international isolation and economic hardship. More so, it will escalate the already existing threat of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan if, God forbid, another Mumbai like incidence happens.
For his part, if he survives this recent attack, Mr. Zardari and PPP will emerge stronger and it will be first major setback to Pakistan’s establishment in their fight with civilian leadership. Ironically, this battle for civilian supremacy, once again, has to be fought by PPP and PPP alone.

Sugar Crisis – Shouldn’t we be thinking free market?

On October 29th, in Supreme Court, during a suo motto notice on sugar prices, Federal Govt. and mill owners agreed to sell sugar at a price fixed by the Lahore High Court. This has averted a standoff for now. However this seems to be an ad hoc arrangement on the pricing and is unlikely to address the shortage issue. There remain issues that need to be debated for they are not only linked with the current sugar crisis but go way beyond the sugar crisis to our overall economy. Unfortunately, the whole sugar debate has been argued in the gambit of superficial of greed and oppression and the real reasons for these events are a little deeper than what appear on the surface.
Pakistan’s economy has always been a variant of a socialist economy. The state has been sitting on the most lucrative economic opportunities directly (i.e. through nationalization) and indirectly. This is the reason of a whole range of economic issues we face and by devising a price formula, a problem created by the state’s intervention is being fixed by the same.
The food industries in general and sugar industry in particular are the most heavily regulated industries in Pakistan. The government has been controlling prices through imposition of import/export quotas and fixing prices. For sugar, the aim in the last decade was to protect a noncompetitive dying sugar industry. In real economic sense, the issue is not the higher price now but the price that people paid in the past to support a noncompetitive industry. If an industry is competitive no more, it better die down rather than being supported at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. To fix our economic mess, we need to consider this not only in the case of sugar but a whole range of other industries. Successive governments, in vain, have been trying for years to protect the textile industry. Same is for sports good industry and IT industry. And for this protectionism, a consumer in Pakistan is paying on average $1000-$3000 more for an average car of the same built and make and of poorer quality than does one in India. When the competitive advantage is lost, the smart societies plan a smooth transition of resources to the sectors which are still competitive. For us, protectionism remains our first big folly that has led to the present disaster.
Second folly is price control itself. Assume that some 25 miles from Lahore in Amritsar, the sugar is sold at India Rupees 32 (Appox. PKR 60). Sugar has a very large distribution network, involving dealers and sub-dealers in thousands across the country. When the government fixes a price at mill that is significantly below the regional price and enforces mills (the only entity where government can practically manage the price) to sell sugar to dealers at PKR 36 assuming that it will be sold at the retail at PKR 40, it leads to nothing but hoarding or smuggling to Amritsar or Afghanistan. Distributors can simply wait till the shortage forces the government to allow the import of the sugar at a higher than PKR 40 price thus allowing them to sell their stock at a higher price. Even if 10% of the distributors indulge in this, what you get in market is shortage of the commodity. One can argue that this act on the part of distributors is cruel but it does not change the ground reality and the public policy needs to be formulated on rationality and not the utopia.
Price fixing, at the best, partially solves problem in the short-term while making it emerge more severely in the future. Last year, we were dealing with shortage of wheat which we decided to fix with fixing the price of wheat. That has led to the lower production of sugarcane and a sugar crisis. Now, the rice crisis is on the horizon. This cannot go like this. Someone needs to take a bold step of deregulating the food market completely. Government’s intervention in the market has made the market inefficient and has led to rampant corruption on the part of bureaucratic bodies like TCP and PASSCO. It is time that the government leaves the market to its own and let the prices and supply and demand settle based on market dynamics. Government’s role in food supplies should, at the best, be to have buffer stock of food for security needs and to deal with famine like situations.
The process will be painful initially. This is a pain that has to be suffered, for if delayed, these long queues for food items will descent us into a chaos similar to that of former communist bloc. You suffer a bit now or you suffer a lot later is the choice we have. The short-term solutions, like paying to poor and philanthropy, will somewhat ease the pain on an inevitable path. In the longer run, we need to focus on increasing the purchasing power of our masses, for in a globalized economy, we will be crushed if we do not increase our spending power. We as a nation have very little time to be agents of change or else we will become its victims.

Pakistan Army - A Need to Change the National Security Doctrine

We live in a world that sits on the brink of a world war. Never has there been more volatility in the world since early twentieth century. The volatility is of the magnitude that gave birth to two world wars and ended with the emergence of a new global order of post-colonial era.
Of a few possible flash points of this imminent conflict, the most serious are Af-Pak and Indo-Pak issues. Pakistan Army, marred by a series of internal and external changes on ground, has to take this factor into their calculation when they devise any strategy in their bid to hold on to the absolute power, they have enjoyed in Pakistan in last five decades.
Army in part created and in part allied with conservative fundamentalist elements who drew their strength from either religion or a perceived Ideology of Pakistan or a combination of both. It had done this historically against a strong liberal leftist movement, having special attraction among poor and among people of smaller provinces. In fact, Pakistan Army served as a gun to protect and ensure protected economy where certain classes, within and outside Army, thrived on a system of perks and privileges granted by the state.
Initially, it was Army through whom the derived their power. However, with time the conservative elements gained enough strength to become a force to reckon with. Thus started the infighting between the establishment of Pakistan on many fronts. On one level, Nawaz Sharif's fight with Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Asif Nawaz and ultimately Pervez Musharraf was a manifestation of this infighting amongst the ruling establishment of Pakistan. On another level, the fight between fundamentalist elements and Pakistan Army, especially in the backdrop of Lal Masjid Operation reflects this infighting.
Things have reached a point where in the triangle of Army, conservative elements and liberal democratic Pakistan, Army needs to ally with one of the two remaining elements to survive. Army realizes that the existential threat to all things Pakistani, including Army, comes from the conservative base who are not only fighting an armed war against the state but have penetrated into country’s bureaucracy, judiciary, media and even Army itself. This ideology has no room for an Armed Force modeled on British Military practices. If and when these forces triumph, the Army, just like all the other institutions, will be among the targets of these forces. Unfortunately, in the wake of this eminent threat that has weakened but not subsided, the debate within the Army seems to be stemming from the ideological beliefs of individuals, a strong sense of xenophobia, and a world view that has been proven wrong many times in last 7 years. Sometimes it seems as though the same elements are shaping/reshaping the debate within the Army. Army needs to weigh her options carefully and figure out how best to protect its power from complete erosion in Pakistan.
What Army needs to realize is that the near-collapse Pakistan was facing in 2007-08 was not because of one man. It was the result of an ideology and policy that spans more than 4 decades. It is through a series of surgical and cosmetic initiatives that The State of Pakistan has recovered a bit from abyss. Resorting to the same policies and embracing the same ideology will lead to similar consequences.
For now, Army seems bound to cut to size the present democratic setup. For this, it will need full support of PML-N, a conservative political party with substantial sympathy for Taliban and other hard-line organizations, along with covert support of outfits like JI, Tehrik-i-Insaaf etc who are open in their support for militants. This move is likely to strengthen these elements. The question both sides need to ask themselves is what will happen once PPP is out of picture. A rational analysis on part of Army is lacking as to whether it is better of letting the present setup work, root out the conservative challenge to its hegemony and to the state of Pakistan of which Army is the biggest stakeholder or to side with conservatives, root out the present setup and then settle score with conservative elements. In latter, Army will not have the much needed backing of liberal political forces, especially PPP, which was instrumental in Swat operation and other such gains Army has made against militants. Where things stand right now, it seems highly unlikely that Army will succeed in ensuring that it is not subservient to some other element in the new power equation. The question is whether it decides to be subservient to conservatives or to a genuine democratic setup.
In an impulsive thought process, one distant probability could be that Army, sensing the change in global power balance, is biding time by ensuing chaos through collaborating with fundamentalists. The only drawback of this approach is that once things reach the tipping point in chaos, they do not remain in control of anyone. Even if successful, the end result of this approach seems more likely to be advantage fundamentalists rather than advantage Pakistan Army. If the calculation is that the political conservatives Army is planning to ally with will be able to compensate for the popular support of the present setup, it seems unlikely. The political forces it is planning to align with will lose bulk of their support base the moment they start siding with Army against militants. Where will N or TI derive support if it becomes a part of a pro-US armed assault? And how can JI support any assault of armed militants?
To start with, this approach of siding with conservatives is not sustainable because of international considerations. Just when US and allies are willing to offer reward for Taliban who might renounce their previous ideology and are willing to accommodate Pashtuns in any permanent Afghan setup, it will be naive to assume that they are going to let go Afghanistan any time soon or are going to agree to a pre-9/11 status quo in the region. This is the biggest factor being overlooked by Pakistan Army in their strategic calculations. If history is anything to go by, Pakistan Army has time and again failed to realize the geo-political realities of the region and to come up with a practical strategic roadmap for the institution as well as the country and it seems this time its calculations are no different.
Army might be thinking that because of its vitality in the region, as has been the case in the past, US will tolerate any of Army's misadventures in the domestic political scenario of Pakistan. In my humble opinion, post 9/11, US has not spent US$ 2.1 trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq to agree to a status quo. It seems evident that greater civilian control through elected representatives in Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon (the buffer states between the modern world and the Middle East) remains cornerstone of US/West’s policy in the new world order. My fear is that if Army pushes too far against the democratic setup and present regime, it will have to face a very sharp response from international community. In this course of conflict, the day will be very unfortunate for Pakistan when international forces warn Pakistan's Security Apparatus to ensure the physical safety of President of Pakistan.

Army might be hoping that in any open conflict with West, China or KSA will come to their aid. In case of China, this assertion has been proven wrong time and again in recent times (most notably Kargil and situation emerging after attack on Indian Parliament). Also, China is apprehensive of growing militancy and rise of conservative elements in Pakistan and considers it a destabilizing factor in its western areas. As for Saudi Arabia, it does not have enough clout to pull such Anti-US venture through in a region like Af-Pak.
No matter how one sees it, short of an all out chaos, Army's best option is to agree to a subservient role to the civilian setup and sit with the civilian govt. to layout parameters for national security doctrine ensuring the preservation of Army's clout to the degree it can be protected and ensuring that Pakistan's vital interests vis-a-vis India, Nuclear Program, and economic affairs are safeguarded. If Army's concerns are these issues, I am hopeful that civilian setup and Army can reach a consensus. If Army wants to assert itself as the dominant player in policy making and national politics, then I am afraid the days for it are numbered. In that case, Army must be ready to face the monster, the conservatives in this country are. I would recommend that this is high time that an informal think-tank should be established comprising sane heads from all political parties in parliament and of notable national security professionals and analysts to analyze the security, foreign affairs and defense affairs. The forum should debate openly all the issues confronting Pakistan’s national security and discuss possible courses of action without the fear of being labeled unpatriotic etc. The aim should be to come up with bare-minimum consensus on key national security issues san hypocrisy in light of emerging global realities. It is time to be true to ourselves rather than being marred by a world view created in utopia. Without it our survival seems at stake.

Kerry Lugar Bill and Pakistan's internal power game

The cat is out of the bag. Pakistan is heading for the most decisive moment of its political history. The issue at stake is not merely the survival of PPP government but also of future direction of Pakistani politics, foreign policy and social fabric. What bothers me the most is that all the debate around this bill is mere rhetoric. The opponents of this bill in Pakistan are playing on rhetoric and have no substance to offer. Not even one article or discussion has actually pointed to the sections of the bill on which the opponents of the bill have objections. The usual buzz words of ghairat, sovereignty etc are used without substantiating the points of contention in the bill.

In fact, the whole line of attack of the opponents of the bill is absurd and opportunistic. Shaheen Sehbai, Kamran Khan and PML-N etc a week ago were saying that US does not trust the present civilian setup of Pakistan and thus will not give them any aid. Now once the aid is here, the same elements are saying that the civilian govt. convinced Americans to insert these clauses. Now I am confused on which of their assertions should I believe. How could the govt. on which Americans were not willing to trust to give aid overnight convinced Americans to insert these clauses and what does this contradiction tell us about the credibility of opponents of this bill? More importantly, in the words of Sheikh Rasheed, is American Senate or House a “sola saal ki dosheza” who got swayed by Ambassador Haqqani to add these clauses to the bill? Come on, talk sense and give us a break, you propaganda organs of military establishment.

Also, the opponents, aligned with the Pakistan Army, say that we do not need aid on such humiliating conditions. Now, as the bill states and we can all read this that all the conditions are for military aid. Now if the military does not need the aid on these conditions why all this fuss. If there will be no military aid, there will be no conditions. And if military itself needs military aid, then sir beggars cannot be choosers is what your media mouth organs tell us day in day out.

From food aid coming on camels with placards of “Thank You USA” to the conditions of Pressler amendment, in which 12 Presidential certificates were required on issues ranging from democratization, to rollback of nuclear program, to human rights violations came under Zia Ul Haq regime and the Amir ul Momineen and father of these ghairatmunds accepted all aid (total $ 3.2 billion in 5 years, peanuts compared to $ 7.5 billion current aid) under it, it was not humiliating for these ghairatmunds. In 2003, under the regime of COAS Pervaiz Musharraf, $ 3 billion for 5 years (again peanuts compared to $ 7.5 billion) aid was sanctioned on condition of presidential certification on restoration of democracy, nuclear non-proliferation, and countering terrorism. Not only this, but under COAS’s regime, military aid was linked to Pakistan’s assurance of not letting “Pakistani Occupied Kashmir’s” territory to be used for terrorist camps. Neither media henchmen nor PML-N or Pakistan Army created any fuss about such “humiliating conditions” and accepted and consumed all the aid.

And how can we blame Americans for asking us to ensure nuclear nonproliferation, when under our COAS President, country’s chief nuclear scientist acknowledged his role in nuclear technology smuggling on national TV? Or how can we blame Americans for asking us to ensure that our land will not be used to export terrorism when our COAS president banned six outfits blamed to be involved in terrorist activities in India on January 14, 2002? Can these rhetoric machines talk any sense to start with? Is any honesty left in Pakistani journalism?

The fuss is not about aid or any of the rhetoric these clones talk about. Nor is it about Army’s concern for national security. It’s a power game where Army sees its power being seriously curtailed as a result of changing times and geo-political realities of the world and the region. The converged interests have made the Army under-siege by fundamentalist political forces join hand with the same forces. The target for now is Asif Zardari and in the hatred of the man both sides are overlooking what will await them, if they succeed.

I wonder how Army can be so short-sighted to have joined hands with the same elements whose websites even today have clips portraying it as a barbaric force committing human rights atrocities in Swat? Has Army forgotten how ruthless these elements have been in their propaganda against Army when their interests collided? Has Army forgotten the blowing up of Army convoys in the aftermath of Lal Masjid and the support by these same elements of these attacks?

On the other hand, these fundamentalist elements will at the best reach a regime like Musharraf regime even if Zardari is out of the picture. The fundamentalist forces need complete control of state and Army wants the same. Zardari for now is the common enemy but even if he is out, both sides will be up in arms against each other. If fundamentalist elements think that Army will give them the same political backing that they enjoyed in 80s and 90s, then this is not going to happen anymore for now Army and fundamentalist political forces need absolute power for themselves.

The role of PML-N in the whole episode has been highly disappointing. The party, who wanted to hang Musharraf for set an example for any future military interventionist and portrayed itself as flag bearer of democracy, ran on one call from COAS for a mid-night secret meeting. As Ahmad Faraz once said

Bus is kadar tha ke darbar se bulawa tha – gadagaran-e-sukhan ke hajoom samne hain

Also, Aitzaz Ahsan who would give us lectures on why this state should be turned from a national security state to social welfare state is silent when the emotional exploitation is on in the name of national security once more. I was expecting a dharna of Wukala bradari against the blatant interference of Army in the affairs of civilian government.

I personally think that it is a storm in teacup. Army just wants to stretch herself and see how far it can go in the wake of attempts to curtail its political dominance in Pakistan. They want to give a signal to US that they still have politicians in their pocket in Republic of Pakistan and also want to see how serious Americans are in their determination to democratize Pakistan? They also want to gauge the response of other international players in the wake of threat of military takeover in Pakistan. They will specially be looking for silent consent of China and UK for such action to see if they have the ability to do another coup or intervention in the future.

This, however, is a dangerous strategy. Army’s action has raised the stakes for all political players. And events might take turn where impulsive actions might lead to a situation leading to things which are not intended, including a military takeover or agitation on streets by elements backed by Army.

What options does the political government have? First and foremost, it has no room to budge. Budging now will be the beginning of countdown for this setup which cannot be afforded. What is at stake is whether Pakistan will become a modern democratic state or will it become a lawless jungle controlled by dictators. Govt. needs to stand firm. It needs to make sure that it gets the bill in its present form endorsed through the parliament and then take a massive restructuring of armed forces and intelligence agencies to assert its writ. As for masses, I am sure they do not care about conditions imposed by US.

Govt. should also initiate the proposed Anti-Terrorism Force under Interior Ministry. If Army decides to stage a takeover, this time it should be a final showdown. PPP should give call to masses to do dharna outside the parliament house to protect the civilian setup and should challenge Army to come crushing these masses. This is how Russians protected their newborn democracy in 1992 and this is what we should do in Pakistan. I, for my part, am ready to do this. It’s a make or break decision for us all. So get ready for this my countrymen. Unlike the media perpetrated dharnas of last one year, this time, if things come to this point

Tu jena hu ga marna hu ga – dharna hu ga dharna hu ga

If Govt. fails in getting this bill passed, the government should go for new elections. If it wins well and good, if it does not, then let us see how these ghairatmunds run Pakistan without the aid and loans for even 6 months in these turbulent moments of our history.

For some reason, I personally think that tide of time is in favor of us the people. Sooner the Mododites and Army realize this, the better they and Pakistan will be. In the words of Manmohan Singh, no force in the world can stop the march of an idea whose time has come. Time of Army’s exit from country’s polity, midnight GHQ deals and rhetoric based exploitation is over in Pakistan. We are moving forward. Join us or be left out.

On Opposition to Kerry Lugar Bill and Other Emotional Exploitation in the name of Anti-Americanism

Below is complete text of Kerry Lugar Bill. The fuss about the bill has been that it's a sellout of national interest to US. I don't think anyone criticizing the bill has actually read this bill. So I invite the readers to read this bill before commenting on it.

First and foremost, the civilian aid has no strings attached to it. The only conditions are on military aid (which is not part of $ 1.5 billion/ yr). Even these strings are far from sellout that our right-wing fundo toddies are bound on telling us.

What are the conditions? In Section VI of the bill they are stated as:

(c) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a certification to the appropriate congressional committees by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, that the security forces of Pakistan--

(1) are making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan;

(2) are making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban and associated militant groups from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and

(3) are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

Now I can understand, like anyone else, what is pinching these toddies the most. It's the 3rd clause which emphasizes US's support for constitutional process in Pakistan. These toddies (rightly called as Syapa Group by Abbas Athar) have always thrived on such military interventions in the past. So, it makes sense that it hurts them. But for people of Pakistan, nuclear non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, ensuring that Pakistan's territory is not used for attacks in neighboring countries (including China and Central Asian states which had such complaints in last 20 years), and a commitment of USA to democracy in Pakistan are all issues of consensus.

It is just that the forces of regression, whose seed was sowed in our land by Mododi's philosophy and which have infiltrated deep in our media and academia under the patronage of various military regimes (most in Zia-Ul-Haq's) are bound on putting Pakistan on path of confrontation with not only United States but everything that stands for modern world. These Majid Nizamis, Hamid Guls and Jamat-I-Islamis and their prodigies in political classes, judiciary, media, business community and academia have thrived on this isolation of Pakistan. Ghairat, hamiyat, khudmukhtari etc are emotional catch phrases whose repeated utterance in media arouses the educated classes of Punjab and with out looking at the facts and applying their brains to analyze issues, they fall for the cliches so cleverly created by the Mododi's media in Pakistan.

There first argument was the government wouldn't succeed in getting the aid. When it became eminent that this wouldn't be the case, the line was that because of the credibility of the government, no direct aid will be given to the civilian government. In the actual bill, there is complete trust on political government. In fact, reading it will give you a sense that all the conditions are a clear indication that the mistrust US has is on civilian and military bureaucracy of Pakistan and so it wants to make sure that the constitutional process continues for the proper disbursement of this aid to Pakistanis. So now anokha ladlas had no option but to call this bill a sell out and flare the anti-US sentiments among people of Pakistan.

This misled and deceitful exploitation of emotions is not limited to Aid alone. Another instance of such misleading Anti-US propaganda can be seen in opposition to Drone Attacks. All the hue and cry on drone attacks comes from Punjab or Mullah elements of Pashtun areas. It is claimed that these attacks are a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. This is something which again is an arousing argument repeated time and again on media and has resonance with urban educated classes of Punjab. Here is the other, and I think more clearer side, of the picture. Drone attacks take place in areas on which Pakistan has lost control and are made against elements who have declared themselves to be enemies of Pakistan and have taken responsibility of attacks inside Pakistan. Now, what should I call these Hamid Mirs, Ansar Abbasis, and Imran Khans opposing these drone attacks, if not 5th columnists. For just like when Allied Forces were fighting Nazis to free France, the Hamid Mirs of France (the 5th columnists) were saying that Allied Forces are violating the sovereignty of France. This is the level of absurdity of this Anti-US campaign carried out by Mododi media and accepted by the urban educated classes of Lahore and Islamabad.

Yes we need to thrive for economic self reliance but this is something that the government cannot do. No govt. in the world has done this for its citizens. This is something that the society and its entrepreneurial spirits does. So my countrymen let us join hands to revive that entrepreneurial spirit in our land rather than taking this anti-American bait of inaction. Till then our friends across the world are trying to help us, so let us accept their help on terms that are more in our best interest than theirs.

Instead of wasting our anger at Anti-US sentiments flared up by Mododi media, let us focus on ensuring that we put pressure on our government to take to task the supporters and inciters of terrorism in our society including TV anchors, political leaders and scholars. This is a war of our survival in which our men, women and children are losing their lives day in day out. It is not America's war. It's our own war since late 70s when these monsters started blowing our mosques and markets. We have to fight it for our survival and we need to combat everyone who is on their side with word or with sword.

To the Mododites, the time for a modern, democratic and liberal Pakistan walking side by side international community towards prosperity is here. Join us wholeheartedly or you will be left out.

S.962

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The people of Pakistan and the United States have a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.

(2) In February 2008, the people of Pakistan elected a civilian government, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over governance and their own democratic reform and political development.

(3) A democratic, moderate, modernizing Pakistan would represent the wishes of the Pakistani people and serve as a model to other countries around the world.

(4) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with over 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of 2 percent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.

(5) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.

(6) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past 7 years.

(7) Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more al Qaeda terrorist suspects have been apprehended in Pakistan than in any other country, including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.

(8) Despite the sacrifices and cooperation of the security forces of Pakistan, the top leadership of al Qaeda, as well as the leadership and rank-and-file of affiliated terrorist groups, are believed to be using Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan as a haven and a base from which to organize terrorist actions in Pakistan and globally, including--

(A) attacks outside of Pakistan that have been attributed to groups with Pakistani connections, including--

(i) the suicide car bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, which killed 58 people on June 7, 2008; and

(ii) the massacre of approximately 165 people in Mumbai, India, including 6 United States citizens, in late November 2008; and

(B) attacks within Pakistan, including--

(i) an attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore on March 3, 2009;

(ii) an attack at the Marriott hotel in Islamabad on September 9, 2008;

(iii) the bombing of a political rally in Karachi on October 18, 2007;

(iv) the targeting and killing of dozens of tribal, provincial, and national holders of political office;

(v) an attack by gunfire on the U.S. Principal Officer in Peshawar in August 2008; and

(vi) the brazen assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007.

(9) In the 12-month period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, Pakistan's security forces have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency that has spread from FATA into settled areas, including the Swat Valley and other parts of NWFP and Balochistan. This struggle has taken the lives of more than 1,500 police and military personnel and left more than 3,000 wounded.

(10) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, `Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan.'.

(11) According to a Government Accountability Office Report (GAO-08-622), `since 2003, the administration's national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA' and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 22 U.S.C. 2656f note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53; 22 U.S.C. 2375 note).

(12) In the past year, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with two-thirds of the population living on less than $2 a day and one-fifth of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program.

(13) The people of Pakistan and the United States share many compatible goals, including--

(A) combating terrorism and violent radicalism, both inside Pakistan and elsewhere;

(B) solidifying democracy and the rule of law in Pakistan;

(C) promoting the economic development of Pakistan, both through the building of infrastructure and the facilitation of increased trade;

(D) promoting the social and material well-being of Pakistani citizens, particularly through development of such basic services as public education, access to potable water, and medical treatment; and

(E) safeguarding the peace and security of South Asia, including by facilitating peaceful relations between Pakistan and its neighbors.

(14) According to consistent opinion research, including that of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (December 28, 2007) and the International Republican Institute (January 29, 2008), many people in Pakistan have historically viewed the relationship between the United States and Pakistan as a transactional one, characterized by a heavy emphasis on security issues with little attention to other matters of great interest to citizens of Pakistan.

(15) The election of a civilian government in Pakistan in February 2008 provides an opportunity, after nearly a decade of military-dominated rule, to place relations between Pakistan and the United States on a new and more stable foundation.

(16) Both the Government of Pakistan and the United States Government should seek to enhance the bilateral relationship through additional multi-faceted engagement in order to strengthen the foundation for a consistent and reliable long-term partnership between the two countries.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) COUNTERINSURGENCY- The term `counterinsurgency' means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan through violent means.

(3) COUNTERTERRORISM- The term `counterterrorism' means efforts to combat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), or other individuals and entities engaged in terrorist activity or support for such activity.

(4) FATA- The term `FATA' means the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

(5) NWFP- The term `NWFP' means the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial capital.

(6) PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS- The term `Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas' includes the Pakistan regions known as NWFP, FATA, and parts of Balochistan in which the Taliban or Al Qaeda have traditionally found refuge.

(7) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE- The term `security-related assistance' means--

(A) grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763);

(B) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.);

(C) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.);

(D) any equipment, supplies, and training provided pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3456); and

(E) any equipment, supplies, and training provided pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181; 122 Stat. 368).

(8) SECURITY FORCES OF PAKISTAN- The term `security forces of Pakistan' means the military and intelligence services of the Government of Pakistan, including the Armed Forces, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Bureau, police forces, levies, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary.

(9) MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- The term `major defense equipment' has the meaning given in section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794(6)).

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States--

(1) to support the consolidation of democracy, good governance, and rule of law in Pakistan;

(2) to support economic growth and development in order to promote stability and security across Pakistan;

(3) to affirm and build a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship with Pakistan;

(4) to further the sustainable economic development of Pakistan and the improvement of the living conditions of its citizens, including in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, by expanding United States bilateral engagement with the Government of Pakistan, especially in areas of direct interest and importance to the daily lives of the people of Pakistan;

(5) to work with Pakistan and the countries bordering Pakistan to facilitate peace in the region and harmonious relations between the countries of the region;

(6) to work with the Government of Pakistan to prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, or elsewhere in the world;

(7) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate military, paramilitary, and police action against terrorist targets;

(8) to work with the Government of Pakistan to help bring peace, stability, and development to all regions of Pakistan, especially those in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, including support for an effective counterinsurgency strategy;

(9) to expand people-to-people engagement between the United States and Pakistan, through increased educational, technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;

(10) to encourage and promote public-private partnerships in Pakistan in order to bolster ongoing development efforts and strengthen economic prospects, especially with respect to opportunities to build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan; and

(11) to encourage the development of local analytical capacity to measure progress on an integrated basis across the areas of donor country expenditure in Pakistan, and better hold the Government of Pakistan accountable for how the funds are being spent.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS.

(a) Authorization- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the following amounts:

(1) For fiscal year 2009, up to $1,500,000,000.

(2) For fiscal year 2010, up to $1,500,000,000.

(3) For fiscal year 2011, up to $1,500,000,000.

(4) For fiscal year 2012, up to $1,500,000,000.

(5) For fiscal year 2013, up to $1,500,000,000.

(b) Availability of Funds-

(1) IN GENERAL- Of the funds appropriated in each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a)--

(A) none of the amounts appropriated may be made available after the date of the enactment of this Act for assistance to Pakistan unless the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with subsection (j); and

(B) not more than $750,000,000 may be made available for assistance to Pakistan in any fiscal year after 2009 unless the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits to the appropriate congressional committees during that fiscal year--

(i) a certification that assistance provided to Pakistan under this Act to date has made or is making substantial progress toward achieving the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to subsection (j)(1); and

(ii) a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification described in clause (i).

(2) MAKER OF CERTIFICATION- In the event of a vacancy in, or the termination of, the position of the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the certification described under paragraph (1)(B) may be made by the Secretary of State.

(c) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to provide such waiver.

(d) Sense of Congress on Foreign Assistance Funds- It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to $1,500,000,000 per year for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for the purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(e) Sense of Congress on Security-related Assistance- It is the sense of Congress that security-related assistance to the Government of Pakistan--

(1) should be provided in close coordination with the Government of Pakistan, designed to improve the Government's capabilities in areas of mutual concern, and maintained at a level that will bring significant gains in pursuing the policies set forth in paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) of section 4; and

(2) should be geared primarily toward bolstering the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Government to effectively defeat the Taliban-backed insurgency and deny popular support to al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are based in Pakistan.

(f) Use of Funds-

(1) IN GENERAL- Funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be used for projects intended to benefit the people of Pakistan, including projects that promote--

(A) just and democratic governance, including--

(i) police reform, equipping, and training;

(ii) independent, efficient, and effective judicial systems;

(iii) political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law;

(iv) respect for human and civil rights and the promotion of an independent media;

(v) transparency and accountability of all branches of government and judicial proceedings;

(vi) anticorruption efforts among bureaucrats, elected officials, and public servants at all levels of military and civilian government administration;

(vii) countering the narcotics trade; and

(viii) the implementation of legal and political reforms in the FATA;

(B) economic freedom, including--

(i) sustainable economic growth, including in rural areas, and the sustainable management of natural resources;

(ii) investments in energy and water, including energy generation and cross-border infrastructure projects with Afghanistan;

(iii) employment generation, including essential basic infrastructure projects such as roads and irrigation projects and other physical infrastructure; and

(iv) worker rights, including the right to form labor unions and legally enforce provisions safeguarding the rights of workers and local community stakeholders;

(C) investments in people, particularly women and children, including--

(i) broad-based public primary and secondary education and vocational training for both boys and girls;

(ii) food security and agricultural development to ensure food staples and other crops that provide economic growth and income opportunities in times of severe shortage;

(iii) quality public health, including medical clinics with well trained staff serving rural and urban communities;

(iv) vocational training for women and access to microfinance for small business establishment and income generation for women; and

(v) higher education to ensure a breadth and consistency of Pakistani graduates to prepare citizens to help strengthen the foundation for improved governance and economic vitality, including through public-private partnerships; and

(D) long-term development in regions of Pakistan where internal conflict has caused large-scale displacement.

(2) FUNDING FOR POLICE REFORM, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING- Up to $100,000,000 of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) should be used for police reform, equipping, and training.

(g) Preference for Building Local Capacity- The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contacts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.

(h) Authority To Use Funds for Operational and Audit Expenses-

(1) IN GENERAL- Of the amounts appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a)--

(A) up to $10,000,000 may be used for administrative expenses of Federal departments and agencies in connection with the provision of assistance authorized by this section;

(B) up to $30,000,000 may be made available to the Inspectors General of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and other relevant Executive branch agencies in order to provide audits and program reviews of projects funded pursuant to this section; and

(C) up to $5,000,000 may be used by the Secretary to establish a Chief of Mission Fund for use by the Chief of Mission in Pakistan to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.

SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Certain Military Assistance- Beginning in fiscal year 2010, no grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and no assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State makes the certification required under subsection (c).

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers- Beginning in fiscal year 2012, no letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State makes the certification required under subsection (c).

(c) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a certification to the appropriate congressional committees by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, that the security forces of Pakistan--

(1) are making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan;

(2) are making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban and associated militant groups from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and

(3) are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsections (a) and (b) if the Secretary determines it is important to the national security interests of the United States to provide such waiver.

(e) Prior Notice of Waiver- A waiver pursuant to subsection (d) may not be exercised until 15 days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees written notice of the intent to issue such waiver and the reasons therefor. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Annual Report- The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report on the progress of the security forces of Pakistan in satisfying the requirements enumerated in subsection (c). The Secretary of State shall establish detailed, specific requirements and metrics for evaluating the progress in satisfying these requirements and apply these requirements and metrics consistently in each annual report. This report may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) Coalition Support Funds are critical components of the global fight against terrorism, and in Pakistan provide essential support for--

(A) military operations of the Government of Pakistan to destroy the terrorist threat and close the terrorist safe haven, known or suspected, in the FATA, the NWFP, and other regions of Pakistan; and

(B) military operations of the Government of Pakistan to protect United States and allied logistic operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan;

(2) despite the broad discretion Congress granted the Secretary of Defense in terms of managing Coalition Support Funds, the Pakistan reimbursement claims process for Coalition Support Funds requires increased oversight and accountability, consistent with the conclusions of the June 2008 report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-806);

(3) in order to ensure that this significant United States effort in support of countering terrorism in Pakistan effectively ensures the intended use of Coalition Support Funds, and to avoid redundancy in other security assistance programs, such as Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales, more specific guidance should be generated, and accountability delineated, for officials associated with oversight of this program within the United States Embassy in Pakistan, the United States Central Command, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of Management and Budget; and

(4) the Secretary of Defense should submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a semiannual report on the use of Coalition Support Funds, which may be submitted in classified or unclassified form as necessary.

SEC. 8. PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS STRATEGY.

(a) Development of Comprehensive Strategy- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and such other government officials as may be appropriate, shall develop a comprehensive, cross-border strategy that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, humanitarian, law enforcement support, and strategic communications and information technology--for working with the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, NATO, and other like-minded allies to best implement effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measurers in and near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.

(b) Report- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed description of a comprehensive strategy for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas containing the elements specified in subsection (a) and proposed timelines and budgets for implementing the strategy.

SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--

(1) recognize the bold political steps the Pakistan electorate has taken during a time of heightened sensitivity and tension in 2007 and 2008 to elect a new civilian government, as well as the continued quest for good governance and the rule of law under the elected government in 2008 and 2009;

(2) seize this strategic opportunity in the interests of Pakistan as well as in the national security interests of the United States to expand its engagement with the Government and people of Pakistan in areas of particular interest and importance to the people of Pakistan;

(3) continue to build a responsible and reciprocal security relationship taking into account the national security interests of the United States as well as regional and national dynamics in Pakistan to further strengthen and enable the position of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally;

(4) seek ways to strengthen our countries' mutual understanding and promote greater insight and knowledge of each other's social, cultural and historical diversity through personnel exchanges and support for the establishment of institutions of higher learning with international accreditation; and

(5) explore means to consult with and utilize the relevant expertise and skills of the Pakistani-American community.

SEC. 10. TERM OF YEARS.

With the exception of subsections (b)(1)(B), (j), (k), and (l) of section 5, this Act shall remain in force after September 30, 2013.

Passed the Senate June 24, 2009.

Baseless Hue and Cry on Kerry Lugar Bill

A section in Pakistan media has raised a storm in a tea cup about Kerry Lugar bill and has called it a sellout. Looking at it rationally it seems the best deal Pakistan got get and has got in its history.

In the 1980s the US congress passed the Pakistan Aid Bill for US $ 3.2 Billion over a period of 5 years and the Bill, which required 10-12 Presidential Certifications (at different times) every year including on restoration of democracy, human rights protection, nuclear non proliferation and drugs control.

In the 2003 Congress again passed Pakistan Aid Bill for US 3 billion over a period of 5 years and that too included Presidential waivers certifying Pakistan is moving toward restoration of democracy, nuclear non proliferation, countering terrorism etc.

Kerry- Lugar Bill is the first Pakistan Aid Bill that does not carry Presidential certification every year. However the Secretary Of State has to certify that Pakistan is moving on path to democracy, nuclear non proliferation and control of democracy. This is also Pakistan State Policy.

In any case, it is for US Congress to determine US conditions and for Pakistan to reject aid with conditions it deems unacceptable. In case of the Kerry Lugar bill, the Govt of Pakistan does not consider any condition onerous or unfulfillable. All branches of the Pakistan government have examined and understand the implications of the bill as passed and the Govt is confident that it does not impose humiliating or restrictive condionality. Needless to say this aid package is the best deal Pakistan can get. What is most surprising is that just when Army itself has become custodian on democratic rule why are these fundo elements of media trying to create chaos?

The media fundos cannot digest a Pakistan moving on the path of political and economic stability and have resorted to tactics of lie, deceit and propaganda.

Whom does Punjab belong to?

Our media pundits always portray Nawaz Sharif as the sole leader of Punjab and PML-N as the dominant political force in Punjab. A closer look at the facts and figures and one can find out that this too is an eye-wash created by the media. For its limited nationwide penetration, PML-N needs steroids of the media to rally its limited base. For this a lot of myths have been created about it, the biggest being its dominance in Punjab.

If results of 2008 elections are anything to go by, N is no where close to the dominant status that we are made to believe. We have taken NA results as a benchmark because the larger constituency size makes them more representative of a district. Here are the facts:

1. Of 36 districts in Punjab, N one at least 1 seat in 26 districts, PPP won at least 1 seat in 24 districts.
2. N has more than 50% of seats in 11 out of 36 districts, PPP has more than 50% seats in 9 of 36 districts.
3. N swept 4 districts, PPP 2.
4. Of 5 big cities of Punjab, N is far behind PPP in terms of number of seats in Faisalabad (2nd largest) and Multan (4th largest).
5. In districts north of Okara, N did not win a single seat in 4 districts - of total of 22 districts. For the same area, PPP did not win a single seat in 9 seats.
6. In districts comprising Okara and South, PPP did not win a single seat in only 2 districts (of total 14 distrcits - almost 40% population of Punjab). In comparison, N didn't win a single NA seat in 6 districts of the same area.
7. PML-N won 60 NA seats (41%) compared to PPP's 45 seats (31%).
8. For Provincial Assembly N won 111 seats (37%) compared to 82 seats by PPP (28%).

Above statistics clearly indicate that just when PML-N is the largest party in Punjab in terms of parliamentary presence, it is far from being the dominant force in Punjab.

The media anchors and columnists who are trying to portray Punjab as a one-party province are doing a great disservice to Pakistani Federation on two grounds.
1. It pitches any issue between ruling coalition and PML-N as a clash between Punjab vs Rest (something that is not true based on political map of Punjab shown above).
2. It is undermining the national out-reach of PPP, for now the only national party of Pakistan. Not only that but when it comes to national out-reach (till next elections prove otherwise) even Q has greater national outreach than N.

This smear propaganda coming from the saviors of "Pakistan's ideology" and democrats (like Nusrat Javed and Talat Husain) is, deliberately or unconsciously, a very sinister attempt to make Pakistani political landscape more divisive on ethnic/ regional grounds and must be checked in the larger interest of the Federation.