Ali Malik's blog

Is anyone else also at loss with the recent assertion of PM Gillani that a rise in US troops will lead to increased militancy in Pakistan as a result of influx of Taliban from Afghanistan? Is it not that a few weeks ago, when Waziristan operation was launched our security apparatus showed its displeasure at lack of American troops on the other side of the border and the fact that this leads to Taliban fleeing into Afghanistan? And is it not that it is Pakistan who since 2005 is asking Americans to do more? Then why this sudden change of heart? Where is the consistency in country's security doctrine? Or is there a security doctrine in the first place? The fundamental problem with Pakistan's security doctrine is that the security establishment in the country thinks critical to their strategic interests the elements (read Taliban and other extremists) and tactics (read blatant intervention) that have become extremely unpopular with the people of Pakistan. To defend them the establ

Diagnosing Pakistan

 By Kathy Kemper - 11/10/09 02:34 PM ET Husain Haqqani offered a candid assessment of where Pakistan stands at my IFE / INFO Global Connections Public Policy Roundtable last Friday. In addition to being Pakistan’s youngest ambassador to the U.S., Haqqani was a strong advocate of the late Benazir Bhutto, who stood as a symbol of democracy in a country where dictatorship has long prevailed. 

 Pakistanis, Haqqani noted, believe that the U.S. has long used their country, not engaged it. Hillary Clinton’s trip there was significant to the extent that they saw a different side of our country. In attending town halls and visiting colleges and universities, she tried to demonstrate that the U.S. is genuinely concerned with Pakistan’s welfare. Polls showed that Pakistani approval ratings of the U.S. went up by 7 percent after her visit. Unfortunately, though, one high-profile visit is unlikely to do much, because many of the country’s woes are historically rooted. Pakistan

On recent political developments, I would not waste my time on dealing with the principled arguments, for post mid-night GHQ meeting, the Jeddah dealers (who happened to be convicts as well) had taken the highest moral ground in opposing NRO (a law for mere accused). Neither am I going to ponder on the dichotomy that the biggest beneficiary of NRO, MQM has become its principled opposition. For in power play, talk of principles is waste of time. The realistic analysis thus should revolve around the following questions: • Why Army wants Asif Ali Zardari out? • In this battle of Army (Establishment) vs. PPP, will army succeed in ousting Asif Ali Zardari? • What are the options that Army has, and how practical they are? • What are the options of Asif Ali Zardari? • What will be the consequences if establishment succeeds? What will be the consequences if it fails? I think the reason to oust Zardari can be traced back to PPP’s confrontation with Army on issues like India policy, Kerry Lugar

On October 29th, in Supreme Court, during a suo motto notice on sugar prices, Federal Govt. and mill owners agreed to sell sugar at a price fixed by the Lahore High Court. This has averted a standoff for now. However this seems to be an ad hoc arrangement on the pricing and is unlikely to address the shortage issue. There remain issues that need to be debated for they are not only linked with the current sugar crisis but go way beyond the sugar crisis to our overall economy. Unfortunately, the whole sugar debate has been argued in the gambit of superficial of greed and oppression and the real reasons for these events are a little deeper than what appear on the surface. Pakistan’s economy has always been a variant of a socialist economy. The state has been sitting on the most lucrative economic opportunities directly (i.e. through nationalization) and indirectly. This is the reason of a whole range of economic issues we face and by devising a price formula, a problem created by the sta