ISI: A misstep turning into a master stroke
I do not really know what instigated the hasty move to put IB and ISI under Interior Ministry's control. Putting IB under Interior Ministry makes sense. But it makes no apparent sense to put ISI under Interior Ministry. ISI, as we know, is a defense intelligence agency and has no direct business with Interior Ministry. So rather than going by the usual surface analysis going on in the media and intellegencia circles, let us try to analyze what happened and why? (again I never claim know-all).
Before we go any further let us understand ISI and parameters of current intercourse taking place on this so-called "ISI fiasco" briefly. ISI is Pakistan's premium intelligence service. It has been alleged with meddling in domestic political affairs and has been responsible for creating and aiding King's parties from PML-Junejo to IJI to PML-N to PML-Q. It has drawn a lot of criticism domestically for its involvement in political affairs. Its political mandate, made official by Mr. Bhutto during the Balochistan army action, has always been controvercial. During her two terms Ms. Bhutto tried to curtail ISI. Her first attempt through appointment of General Kallu as its head (replacing Gen. Hamid Gul) did not succeed, for because of ISI's command and control structure, the ranks and files of ISI (planted during Zia regime, mostly driven by hardcore Islamic ideology and mostly serving Army officials) were successful in bypassing Gen. Kallu and worked directly for and reported directly to Gen. Beg (the then Army Chief). According to Ms. Bhutto's interview to Herald in 2001, her second attempt to curtail ISI, by changing its command and reporting structure, was successful. However, based on her account of events in the same interview, the covert establishment aparatus shifted its activities under the fold of MI. Because of these structural reforms, apparantly ISI remained a peripheral agency in Pakistani establishment between 1994-2000.
ISI's initial active operations abroad were limited to India, where it was involved in "Retaliation Activities to RAW's Activities in Pakistan". During Afghan War of 80s, it became the conduit of arms and money to Afghan fighters fighting against Soviet Infiltration. Accounts of Charlie Wilson, Prince Binder and Gen. Hamid Gul suggest that it was ISI which was responsible for giving Afghan Resistance the label of Religious Jihad. Its critics argue, that it was during the Afghan War that ISI got dominated by ideologues who aspired to turn it into the basecamp for Islamic Resistance across the globe.
Whether this Jihadi shade of ISI was driven by the ideology of ISI and Army highups has always been a matter of debate. Some argue, that Army and ISI high command initially used this Jihadi shade of ISI to further their control over Pakistan's establishment, polity and decision making and in the course they ignored the dominance of ISI by Jihadi elements in its ranks and files. They themselves are wary of ISI's activities off late and efforts have been made by Army highups to control the monster the Jihadi ISI has become. This section argues, that though Army is wary of ISI activities, it essentially wants ISI back under its full control and will never let civilian setup take control over ISI, for they see civilian control of ISI as a threat to their hegemony.
Others suggest, that at some level, the top brass of Pakistan's Security aparatus is sympathetic to religious extremist views and supports a world view of us vs them. This segment argues that over the past 6 years, the double-agent role that ISI has played in Afghan war has had the full blessing of Army top brass. They also suggested that the ISI activities in rigging the February 2008 elections in Punjab or supporting Lal Masjid fanatics had complete blessing of Army top brass.
It must also be noted that the world we live in, because of ISI's intrusions in every corner of the world, is not ready to tolerate ISI as it is. This opinion is not confined to US alone, but is equally shared by China, Russia, EU and others in international community. So far, Pakistan Army has been given a benefit of doubt that most of ISI's misadventures in Afghanistan and other parts of the world were done without Army high command's knowledge and were carried out by rogue elements in ISI.
Now let us get back to why the ISI step was taken. One explanation could be that civilian setup wanted to mimic the model of Home Land Security Department of US, also adopted by UK and others, where entire intelligence aparatus is coordinated by Dept. of Homeland Security (in case of Pakistan, Home Ministry). It will be worth noticing that even in US, the Home Land Security initiative has not been successful, and CIA and FBI remain their own bosses. So, it will always take time before this new coordinated homeland security infrastructure comes in place. However there is one difference. In US, the challenge CIA or FBI pose to Homeland Security is ccovert in nature, mostly through delayed or no cooperation with other agencies. Also, this challenge comes only from the ranks of these secret agencies. In case of Pakistan, this challenge was open and came from Pakistan Army. Whether Gen. Kiyani was onboard when the decision was taken and later sucumbed to the pressure of Army top brass is still a matter of debate?
However, this episode has exposed one thing to the outside world. On the eve of the first visit of a civilian Pakistani leader to US in a decade, the links between ISI and Pakistan's Security top brass have been more than exposed. It is perceived as an attempt by Army to check the fixing of ISI by a civilian government. The benefit of doubt Army had so far will be hard to sustain. Any attempt, now, to topple the civilian setup by Army or Gen. Musharraf is even less likely to be received well internationally. My fear is that if any such attempt is made now, even to call for fresh elections, and bringing Army backed elements into power, it can instigate UN-led action against Pakistan. The action can be both economic and military. In this environment, coupled with UN investigation into the killing of Ms Bhutto, any support and backing by our "Arab brethern" will further strengthen the perception in policy making circles in Washington that War on Terror is actually a proxy war West is fighting against their Arab allies and I do not think our "Arab brethern" can take this risk.
To me, whether it was a misstep or planned action, through this act, the efforts to pack the present setup have taken a big hit and effects will be visible soon. Even if it was an illplanned fiasco, it has turned into a political master stroke. From here on, Army will have to conceed on parts of its possession of ISI to civilian setup.
Before we go any further let us understand ISI and parameters of current intercourse taking place on this so-called "ISI fiasco" briefly. ISI is Pakistan's premium intelligence service. It has been alleged with meddling in domestic political affairs and has been responsible for creating and aiding King's parties from PML-Junejo to IJI to PML-N to PML-Q. It has drawn a lot of criticism domestically for its involvement in political affairs. Its political mandate, made official by Mr. Bhutto during the Balochistan army action, has always been controvercial. During her two terms Ms. Bhutto tried to curtail ISI. Her first attempt through appointment of General Kallu as its head (replacing Gen. Hamid Gul) did not succeed, for because of ISI's command and control structure, the ranks and files of ISI (planted during Zia regime, mostly driven by hardcore Islamic ideology and mostly serving Army officials) were successful in bypassing Gen. Kallu and worked directly for and reported directly to Gen. Beg (the then Army Chief). According to Ms. Bhutto's interview to Herald in 2001, her second attempt to curtail ISI, by changing its command and reporting structure, was successful. However, based on her account of events in the same interview, the covert establishment aparatus shifted its activities under the fold of MI. Because of these structural reforms, apparantly ISI remained a peripheral agency in Pakistani establishment between 1994-2000.
ISI's initial active operations abroad were limited to India, where it was involved in "Retaliation Activities to RAW's Activities in Pakistan". During Afghan War of 80s, it became the conduit of arms and money to Afghan fighters fighting against Soviet Infiltration. Accounts of Charlie Wilson, Prince Binder and Gen. Hamid Gul suggest that it was ISI which was responsible for giving Afghan Resistance the label of Religious Jihad. Its critics argue, that it was during the Afghan War that ISI got dominated by ideologues who aspired to turn it into the basecamp for Islamic Resistance across the globe.
Whether this Jihadi shade of ISI was driven by the ideology of ISI and Army highups has always been a matter of debate. Some argue, that Army and ISI high command initially used this Jihadi shade of ISI to further their control over Pakistan's establishment, polity and decision making and in the course they ignored the dominance of ISI by Jihadi elements in its ranks and files. They themselves are wary of ISI's activities off late and efforts have been made by Army highups to control the monster the Jihadi ISI has become. This section argues, that though Army is wary of ISI activities, it essentially wants ISI back under its full control and will never let civilian setup take control over ISI, for they see civilian control of ISI as a threat to their hegemony.
Others suggest, that at some level, the top brass of Pakistan's Security aparatus is sympathetic to religious extremist views and supports a world view of us vs them. This segment argues that over the past 6 years, the double-agent role that ISI has played in Afghan war has had the full blessing of Army top brass. They also suggested that the ISI activities in rigging the February 2008 elections in Punjab or supporting Lal Masjid fanatics had complete blessing of Army top brass.
It must also be noted that the world we live in, because of ISI's intrusions in every corner of the world, is not ready to tolerate ISI as it is. This opinion is not confined to US alone, but is equally shared by China, Russia, EU and others in international community. So far, Pakistan Army has been given a benefit of doubt that most of ISI's misadventures in Afghanistan and other parts of the world were done without Army high command's knowledge and were carried out by rogue elements in ISI.
Now let us get back to why the ISI step was taken. One explanation could be that civilian setup wanted to mimic the model of Home Land Security Department of US, also adopted by UK and others, where entire intelligence aparatus is coordinated by Dept. of Homeland Security (in case of Pakistan, Home Ministry). It will be worth noticing that even in US, the Home Land Security initiative has not been successful, and CIA and FBI remain their own bosses. So, it will always take time before this new coordinated homeland security infrastructure comes in place. However there is one difference. In US, the challenge CIA or FBI pose to Homeland Security is ccovert in nature, mostly through delayed or no cooperation with other agencies. Also, this challenge comes only from the ranks of these secret agencies. In case of Pakistan, this challenge was open and came from Pakistan Army. Whether Gen. Kiyani was onboard when the decision was taken and later sucumbed to the pressure of Army top brass is still a matter of debate?
However, this episode has exposed one thing to the outside world. On the eve of the first visit of a civilian Pakistani leader to US in a decade, the links between ISI and Pakistan's Security top brass have been more than exposed. It is perceived as an attempt by Army to check the fixing of ISI by a civilian government. The benefit of doubt Army had so far will be hard to sustain. Any attempt, now, to topple the civilian setup by Army or Gen. Musharraf is even less likely to be received well internationally. My fear is that if any such attempt is made now, even to call for fresh elections, and bringing Army backed elements into power, it can instigate UN-led action against Pakistan. The action can be both economic and military. In this environment, coupled with UN investigation into the killing of Ms Bhutto, any support and backing by our "Arab brethern" will further strengthen the perception in policy making circles in Washington that War on Terror is actually a proxy war West is fighting against their Arab allies and I do not think our "Arab brethern" can take this risk.
To me, whether it was a misstep or planned action, through this act, the efforts to pack the present setup have taken a big hit and effects will be visible soon. Even if it was an illplanned fiasco, it has turned into a political master stroke. From here on, Army will have to conceed on parts of its possession of ISI to civilian setup.
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