Changing Region and 18th Amendment
In 1947, when the Indian subcontinent got divided and emerged two nation-states of India and Pakistan, it was Pakistan which was the natural ally of the Anglo-Saxon block. The leadership which created India, on the other hand, was more inspired by the Socialist ideals of China and Soviet Union, and ultimately got cozy with the Soviets as a natural consequence of Sino-Indian Conflict.
Ever since 1947, there has been a strong desire on part of a significant section of India, specifically business classes, to open up to Anglo-Saxon block. Similarly, both the Anglo-Saxons and their allies in the older Europe had this deep desire to have India on their side in the global great game. But India's leaning towards the Soviet Block effectively did not let the channels open up as were desired by the two Western blocks and their like-minded entities in India. In fact, India's very origin stems from resistance against the Anglo-Saxon colonization. Despite repeated attempts, the serious efforts to open up channels could not start till Rajiv Gandhi's regime.
The difficulty in engaging India, coupled with a whole range of Geo-political compulsion in the region made Anglo-Saxons rely on India's smaller neighbor Pakistan. Pakistan, for all her disadvantages, was an ideal candidate to be a key Anglo-Saxon ally in the region for a number of reasons. Its political, administrative and military classes had great admiration and regard for Anglo-Saxon civilization and ideals. Its majority of population (especially in the West) was either indifferent to the Anglo-Saxons or had a favorable opinion of them, in latter’s conflict with the Soviets. However in early decades, in the presence of Iran in the region, the role set for Pakistan at the best was of a second fiddle ally.
In case of Pakistan, another problem for the Anglo-Saxons and the anti-Soviet West was the presence of a strong leftist movement in the country. In Pakistan, just like in Iran, to crush the movement, the West and in particular Anglo-Saxons started getting cozier with the non-representative forces rather than trying to engage the masses. It started supporting military regimes and a hard-line religious right to suppress the left-leaning movements. The most decisive lost opportunity for Anglo-Saxons came when after the fall of East Pakistan, Z.A.Bhutto assumed power in the rest of Pakistan. Bhutto, though a politician with a leftist agenda, was inclined to resettle the equation with the Western world, in particular dominant Anglo-Saxons, at new terms. Despite his views on “the myth of independence”, Bhutto was ready to strike a new deal with the Anglo-Saxon nexus. More importantly, the more radical leftist resistance was in the east of the country, which was now Bangladesh and situation was relatively favorable for the West in remaining Pakistan, i.e. West Pakistan. However, since the policy of West regarding Pakistan was ad-hoc and was rooted in colonial, supremacy mindset, and Mr. Bhutto himself could not detach himself from colonizer-colonized thought process, the opportunity got lost. This and other factors, with insecurity vis-à-vis India being a significant one, made Mr. Bhutto shift even more towards China and open up towards the Soviets as well. At the same time, this snub coupled with the Arab-Israel conflict and Americans new found love for Israel, gave Bhutto (and Faisal who himself felt cornered by the Pan-Arab movement) the opportunity to play the Pan-Islamism card on the hope of getting a collective bargain for nations in the region in the form of new terms of engagement between the West and the region and also to quell internal and external threats to those at the center of established order in the region. What Mr. Bhutto failed to realize was that if a bargain with the West is a long-shot for Pakistan alone, how can a collective bargain be any easier specially keeping in view extreme inherent contradictions that laid in Middle Eastern reality.
In my view, had the good sense prevailed on part of the Anglo-Saxons and Mr. Bhutto back then a lot of troubles of the present times could have been avoided. Mr. Bhutto could have been instrumental in creating a left-leaning force in the region that would have been closer to Americans than Soviets in values, just as it happened in Europe and Scandinavia. What is even more ironic is the fact that the opportunity was lost at a time when the West was opening up to China and thus Sino-Pak relations could have made Bhutto's task of creating the West-friendly front in the region easier.
What West failed to realize was that though Bhutto's ideology is left-leaning and he needs a fairer deal on resource distribution between the powers of the West and those who mattered in Pakistan and the region, his political and ideological orientation and social circle was more in line with Westerners rather than the Soviets or Chinese. The cultural ease that existed between Pakistan and the West, thanks to the era of colonization, alone gave the West a big head-start over the Soviets. Just as America or Singapore, once colonies ended up being independent states, entrenched in the Anglo-Saxon values, Pakistan could be the same. The trouble stemmed from the fact that unlike earlier Pakistani regimes, Bhutto wanted relationship of near equals. West's little display of magnanimity and a realization that colonization and supremacy's time is up then, could have saved us all a lot of trouble.
The West on its part kept relying on its trusted allies in Pakistan, i.e. Mullah and Military. Not only that, but for her close proximity to Mullah, Saudis were allowed to increase their influence in Pakistan over Mr. Bhutto's head. When Bhutto got overthrown by Zia, the harsh reality of a hardcore Islamic radical flank, with values in conflict with the Anglo-Saxon values, started to unleash in Pakistan. On the watchdog of Americans, an attempt to radically change the values of the state, the elite, and the society started which led to a state with confused cultural identity that is based on suspicion and hatred for anything non-Muslim or even non-Sect. First, and probably the biggest, setback to the dominant Anglo-Saxon block in the region was this attempt at changing the social values from their core Anglo-Saxon beliefs to a hybrid nationalist, hate-based value system in the name of Islam. Though the followers of this confused and hybrid ideology are a small minority in Pakistan, because of the ruling Mullah-Military alliance under a blind-eye of the West, this ideology took root in the civilian and military establishment of Pakistan. A monster was growing that was to haunt the West in times to come. Not only that but the monster, led to a growth of radical tendencies among the British Pakistanis, who for a number of reasons were one of the least integrated and least resourced communities there. The process allowed Saudi Arabia to enhance her influence in the region which after the demise of the Shah had assumed the role of the key US ally in the region and was desperate for an influence on sectarian lines in the region to counter Shia-Iran.
US and West were not only ignorant of the fatal consequences of this shift in Pakistani value system by their local allies (Mullah and Military), they also assisted the process. Joanne Herrings in the midst of their crusade against the infidel communists helped spark the religious fervor to even greater intensities. Not only that, but the terms of engagement between Americans and the local allies were not clear either. That led the local fanatics to believe that Americans have implicitly given a node to their regional agenda of creating an Islamic Caliphate. For this reason, when the US, after realizing that the damage has been done (albeit conveniently at the end of the cold war) decided to move against the rise of Militant Islam, it left its former allies, like Col. Imam, Gen. Hamid Gul and GIK bitterly disappointed.
The West had lost the influence in the country, first by not settling issues in a bargain with Bhutto, and then by letting Zia erode the country's Anglo-Saxon value system. This conflict with her former allies, led it to take the comfortable route - leaving Pakistan in isolation. This route then seemed all the more easy for India after 40 odd years was finally opening up to the West. So who needed Pakistan, when you could befriend Indians. More so, pleasing Indians and Pakistanis at the same time is close to impossible. Also, though Pakistan had little more utility than Indians in the Middle East, Americans (and Westerners) were still hopeful that like Vietnam, they will be able to settle their issues with Iranians and no other ally is potentially more worthy in the region than Iran. So began an era of estrangement with Pakistan.
The opening up of relationship with India was very warm. The rise of China had made India a lot more desirable ally. Indians wanted to make the best use of Service Outsourcing opportunities in the wealthiest economies during the two most prosperous decades. Soon, Pakistan, now left isolated and in the hands of a power-circle with hard-core religious alignment, started emerging as part of the problem because of rising Islamic Extremism in the region and the export of Jihad. Rather than increasing their direct dealing with Pakistan, Anglo-Saxons decided to deal with Pakistan through Saudis (on whom the reliance had increased because of oil boom as well). Obviously it was a folly for Saudi Arabia’s interest in preserving the Militancy to counter the threat of any popular leftist or Shia revolution in the Middle East, only helped grow the very nexus which had become West's biggest trouble in 90s. Also, the inherent conflict between Saudis and the West, or for that matter an autocratic Mid-Eastern regime and the West, was the conflict of values. Western values of liberty and democracy were a direct threat to the values of their Monarch allies.
9/11 was the first major alarm for the West to rethink their strategy in the region. It probably raised questions but in the aftermath of 9/11, at least in the near-term, the word was no-change. But the problems in the original policy started becoming more visible as the time progressed. The reliance on a military dictator, coupled with double-cross by a religious-oriented Pakistani Military, made rethinking of the strategy inevitable. In the broader scheme of things, the issues such as Pakistan's security establishment's reservations about Indian ambitions in the region also came to fore. The reality on ground remains that no matter how logical cordial relations between India and Pakistan sound, they are not practical in the short-term.
In the last three years, a new blue-print for terms of engagement in the region is in offing. The key postulates of the engagement seem engaging both representative elements and the military in the broader solution, addressing security concerns of Pakistan, initiating covert diplomacy to resolve issues between India and Pakistan, assuring Pakistan of a long-term strategic engagement rather than a temporary alliance, and accepting Pakistan's (in particular its security establishment's) role in Afghan solution at the expense of Indian influence in Afghanistan seem key components of the rehashed strategy. One can see that some of these postulates are self-contradicting and can only work if either because of some magic-wand, Pakistan and India resolve their differences, or West makes a clear choice between India and Pakistan. I strongly believe that cordial relations with the countries in the region, and most importantly with India, are in the best interest of Pakistan and the region, but the time is not ripe for them.
Another set of realizations seem to be in play in the calculations and make choice easier for Westerners. To deal with the economic mess, Anglo-Saxons needs to opt for a more protectionist economy and thus have to curb outsourcing to India also played a part in the overall calculation. In near future, the economic battle between India and the West (especially US) seems even more intense than any potential row between China and the West. Western economies are service-oriented economies and during the protectionist phase, the impact on services outsourcing is likely to be harsher. Also there is this realization that Iran, for now is not likely to be back as a US-ally in the Middle East and so a suitable ally is needed in the region. And for all its conflicts with the West, Pakistan seems the country closest in the region to the Anglo-Saxon values (even after 3 decades of Islamization attempts). So just when the West hopes of having both Pakistan and India on their side, the focus is more on security Fortress Pakistan for now.
US's direct dealing with Pakistan and its encouragement to non-fundamentalist elements in Pakistan's representative and military establishments for a role in Afghan solution has also troubled Saudi Arabia. This has enabled India and Saudi Arabia to open up the diplomatic channels. Both countries are actively backing a compromise between Taliban and Hamid Karzai on top of Pakistan and the US to ensure their influence in Afghanistan. This latest development has also created differences between the key Western powers (especially the US) and the Indians. Americans have been very categorical in recent times that now is not the time to engage Taliban, after successive failed attempts in the recent past. They have also communicated in clearer terms that any Afghan solution or opening up to Taliban will include Pakistan (read Pakistan Army).
18th amendment in Pakistan’s constitution has unleashed another possibility for Pakistanis and Americans by enhancing provincial autonomy and resolving the issue of the name of NWFP. I do not think that this resolution was a direct result of the situation in the region but it opens up an opportunity for the region. The impulsive reaction of Pakistani Security establishment has been negative vis-à-vis 18th amendment for the fear that it will facilitate disintegration, if and when the situation arises.
For now, the Anglo-Saxons and in particular the US have put their full weight behind protecting the Pakistani federation and this should be treated as a positive development. Despite the fears in Security Establishment of Pakistan, there is a very strong probability that the loosening up of the federation could turn out to be contrary to the thinking of Security Establishment. If Pakistan comes back in the Anglo-Saxon camp, largest populated Pashtun and Baloch areas in a federal, democratic Pakistan will always be a threat to the vulnerable and chaotic/autocratic regimes in Afghanistan and Iran with significant Pashtun and Baloch populations respectively. A Pakistan with harmonious Pashtun and Baloch populations will ensure that if a state arises when the regions’ borders need to be redrawn, the process could be completed with least fragmentation ensuring lesser chaos and more control.
The key of course will be loosening the federation to strengthen it further and to ensure continuation of a representative regime from federal level till the very grassroots. There is a lot between the cup and the lip, but the journey to the lip might have just begun.
Note: This in no way is a prediction of expansionist glorification of Pakistan. In fact, it is just an insight into one of the possibilities that might unleash around us. This is one of the many permutations in the entire probability set. So should be analyzed and explored further but should not be turned into any expansionist schizophrenic ideology.
Ever since 1947, there has been a strong desire on part of a significant section of India, specifically business classes, to open up to Anglo-Saxon block. Similarly, both the Anglo-Saxons and their allies in the older Europe had this deep desire to have India on their side in the global great game. But India's leaning towards the Soviet Block effectively did not let the channels open up as were desired by the two Western blocks and their like-minded entities in India. In fact, India's very origin stems from resistance against the Anglo-Saxon colonization. Despite repeated attempts, the serious efforts to open up channels could not start till Rajiv Gandhi's regime.
The difficulty in engaging India, coupled with a whole range of Geo-political compulsion in the region made Anglo-Saxons rely on India's smaller neighbor Pakistan. Pakistan, for all her disadvantages, was an ideal candidate to be a key Anglo-Saxon ally in the region for a number of reasons. Its political, administrative and military classes had great admiration and regard for Anglo-Saxon civilization and ideals. Its majority of population (especially in the West) was either indifferent to the Anglo-Saxons or had a favorable opinion of them, in latter’s conflict with the Soviets. However in early decades, in the presence of Iran in the region, the role set for Pakistan at the best was of a second fiddle ally.
In case of Pakistan, another problem for the Anglo-Saxons and the anti-Soviet West was the presence of a strong leftist movement in the country. In Pakistan, just like in Iran, to crush the movement, the West and in particular Anglo-Saxons started getting cozier with the non-representative forces rather than trying to engage the masses. It started supporting military regimes and a hard-line religious right to suppress the left-leaning movements. The most decisive lost opportunity for Anglo-Saxons came when after the fall of East Pakistan, Z.A.Bhutto assumed power in the rest of Pakistan. Bhutto, though a politician with a leftist agenda, was inclined to resettle the equation with the Western world, in particular dominant Anglo-Saxons, at new terms. Despite his views on “the myth of independence”, Bhutto was ready to strike a new deal with the Anglo-Saxon nexus. More importantly, the more radical leftist resistance was in the east of the country, which was now Bangladesh and situation was relatively favorable for the West in remaining Pakistan, i.e. West Pakistan. However, since the policy of West regarding Pakistan was ad-hoc and was rooted in colonial, supremacy mindset, and Mr. Bhutto himself could not detach himself from colonizer-colonized thought process, the opportunity got lost. This and other factors, with insecurity vis-à-vis India being a significant one, made Mr. Bhutto shift even more towards China and open up towards the Soviets as well. At the same time, this snub coupled with the Arab-Israel conflict and Americans new found love for Israel, gave Bhutto (and Faisal who himself felt cornered by the Pan-Arab movement) the opportunity to play the Pan-Islamism card on the hope of getting a collective bargain for nations in the region in the form of new terms of engagement between the West and the region and also to quell internal and external threats to those at the center of established order in the region. What Mr. Bhutto failed to realize was that if a bargain with the West is a long-shot for Pakistan alone, how can a collective bargain be any easier specially keeping in view extreme inherent contradictions that laid in Middle Eastern reality.
In my view, had the good sense prevailed on part of the Anglo-Saxons and Mr. Bhutto back then a lot of troubles of the present times could have been avoided. Mr. Bhutto could have been instrumental in creating a left-leaning force in the region that would have been closer to Americans than Soviets in values, just as it happened in Europe and Scandinavia. What is even more ironic is the fact that the opportunity was lost at a time when the West was opening up to China and thus Sino-Pak relations could have made Bhutto's task of creating the West-friendly front in the region easier.
What West failed to realize was that though Bhutto's ideology is left-leaning and he needs a fairer deal on resource distribution between the powers of the West and those who mattered in Pakistan and the region, his political and ideological orientation and social circle was more in line with Westerners rather than the Soviets or Chinese. The cultural ease that existed between Pakistan and the West, thanks to the era of colonization, alone gave the West a big head-start over the Soviets. Just as America or Singapore, once colonies ended up being independent states, entrenched in the Anglo-Saxon values, Pakistan could be the same. The trouble stemmed from the fact that unlike earlier Pakistani regimes, Bhutto wanted relationship of near equals. West's little display of magnanimity and a realization that colonization and supremacy's time is up then, could have saved us all a lot of trouble.
The West on its part kept relying on its trusted allies in Pakistan, i.e. Mullah and Military. Not only that, but for her close proximity to Mullah, Saudis were allowed to increase their influence in Pakistan over Mr. Bhutto's head. When Bhutto got overthrown by Zia, the harsh reality of a hardcore Islamic radical flank, with values in conflict with the Anglo-Saxon values, started to unleash in Pakistan. On the watchdog of Americans, an attempt to radically change the values of the state, the elite, and the society started which led to a state with confused cultural identity that is based on suspicion and hatred for anything non-Muslim or even non-Sect. First, and probably the biggest, setback to the dominant Anglo-Saxon block in the region was this attempt at changing the social values from their core Anglo-Saxon beliefs to a hybrid nationalist, hate-based value system in the name of Islam. Though the followers of this confused and hybrid ideology are a small minority in Pakistan, because of the ruling Mullah-Military alliance under a blind-eye of the West, this ideology took root in the civilian and military establishment of Pakistan. A monster was growing that was to haunt the West in times to come. Not only that but the monster, led to a growth of radical tendencies among the British Pakistanis, who for a number of reasons were one of the least integrated and least resourced communities there. The process allowed Saudi Arabia to enhance her influence in the region which after the demise of the Shah had assumed the role of the key US ally in the region and was desperate for an influence on sectarian lines in the region to counter Shia-Iran.
US and West were not only ignorant of the fatal consequences of this shift in Pakistani value system by their local allies (Mullah and Military), they also assisted the process. Joanne Herrings in the midst of their crusade against the infidel communists helped spark the religious fervor to even greater intensities. Not only that, but the terms of engagement between Americans and the local allies were not clear either. That led the local fanatics to believe that Americans have implicitly given a node to their regional agenda of creating an Islamic Caliphate. For this reason, when the US, after realizing that the damage has been done (albeit conveniently at the end of the cold war) decided to move against the rise of Militant Islam, it left its former allies, like Col. Imam, Gen. Hamid Gul and GIK bitterly disappointed.
The West had lost the influence in the country, first by not settling issues in a bargain with Bhutto, and then by letting Zia erode the country's Anglo-Saxon value system. This conflict with her former allies, led it to take the comfortable route - leaving Pakistan in isolation. This route then seemed all the more easy for India after 40 odd years was finally opening up to the West. So who needed Pakistan, when you could befriend Indians. More so, pleasing Indians and Pakistanis at the same time is close to impossible. Also, though Pakistan had little more utility than Indians in the Middle East, Americans (and Westerners) were still hopeful that like Vietnam, they will be able to settle their issues with Iranians and no other ally is potentially more worthy in the region than Iran. So began an era of estrangement with Pakistan.
The opening up of relationship with India was very warm. The rise of China had made India a lot more desirable ally. Indians wanted to make the best use of Service Outsourcing opportunities in the wealthiest economies during the two most prosperous decades. Soon, Pakistan, now left isolated and in the hands of a power-circle with hard-core religious alignment, started emerging as part of the problem because of rising Islamic Extremism in the region and the export of Jihad. Rather than increasing their direct dealing with Pakistan, Anglo-Saxons decided to deal with Pakistan through Saudis (on whom the reliance had increased because of oil boom as well). Obviously it was a folly for Saudi Arabia’s interest in preserving the Militancy to counter the threat of any popular leftist or Shia revolution in the Middle East, only helped grow the very nexus which had become West's biggest trouble in 90s. Also, the inherent conflict between Saudis and the West, or for that matter an autocratic Mid-Eastern regime and the West, was the conflict of values. Western values of liberty and democracy were a direct threat to the values of their Monarch allies.
9/11 was the first major alarm for the West to rethink their strategy in the region. It probably raised questions but in the aftermath of 9/11, at least in the near-term, the word was no-change. But the problems in the original policy started becoming more visible as the time progressed. The reliance on a military dictator, coupled with double-cross by a religious-oriented Pakistani Military, made rethinking of the strategy inevitable. In the broader scheme of things, the issues such as Pakistan's security establishment's reservations about Indian ambitions in the region also came to fore. The reality on ground remains that no matter how logical cordial relations between India and Pakistan sound, they are not practical in the short-term.
In the last three years, a new blue-print for terms of engagement in the region is in offing. The key postulates of the engagement seem engaging both representative elements and the military in the broader solution, addressing security concerns of Pakistan, initiating covert diplomacy to resolve issues between India and Pakistan, assuring Pakistan of a long-term strategic engagement rather than a temporary alliance, and accepting Pakistan's (in particular its security establishment's) role in Afghan solution at the expense of Indian influence in Afghanistan seem key components of the rehashed strategy. One can see that some of these postulates are self-contradicting and can only work if either because of some magic-wand, Pakistan and India resolve their differences, or West makes a clear choice between India and Pakistan. I strongly believe that cordial relations with the countries in the region, and most importantly with India, are in the best interest of Pakistan and the region, but the time is not ripe for them.
Another set of realizations seem to be in play in the calculations and make choice easier for Westerners. To deal with the economic mess, Anglo-Saxons needs to opt for a more protectionist economy and thus have to curb outsourcing to India also played a part in the overall calculation. In near future, the economic battle between India and the West (especially US) seems even more intense than any potential row between China and the West. Western economies are service-oriented economies and during the protectionist phase, the impact on services outsourcing is likely to be harsher. Also there is this realization that Iran, for now is not likely to be back as a US-ally in the Middle East and so a suitable ally is needed in the region. And for all its conflicts with the West, Pakistan seems the country closest in the region to the Anglo-Saxon values (even after 3 decades of Islamization attempts). So just when the West hopes of having both Pakistan and India on their side, the focus is more on security Fortress Pakistan for now.
US's direct dealing with Pakistan and its encouragement to non-fundamentalist elements in Pakistan's representative and military establishments for a role in Afghan solution has also troubled Saudi Arabia. This has enabled India and Saudi Arabia to open up the diplomatic channels. Both countries are actively backing a compromise between Taliban and Hamid Karzai on top of Pakistan and the US to ensure their influence in Afghanistan. This latest development has also created differences between the key Western powers (especially the US) and the Indians. Americans have been very categorical in recent times that now is not the time to engage Taliban, after successive failed attempts in the recent past. They have also communicated in clearer terms that any Afghan solution or opening up to Taliban will include Pakistan (read Pakistan Army).
18th amendment in Pakistan’s constitution has unleashed another possibility for Pakistanis and Americans by enhancing provincial autonomy and resolving the issue of the name of NWFP. I do not think that this resolution was a direct result of the situation in the region but it opens up an opportunity for the region. The impulsive reaction of Pakistani Security establishment has been negative vis-à-vis 18th amendment for the fear that it will facilitate disintegration, if and when the situation arises.
For now, the Anglo-Saxons and in particular the US have put their full weight behind protecting the Pakistani federation and this should be treated as a positive development. Despite the fears in Security Establishment of Pakistan, there is a very strong probability that the loosening up of the federation could turn out to be contrary to the thinking of Security Establishment. If Pakistan comes back in the Anglo-Saxon camp, largest populated Pashtun and Baloch areas in a federal, democratic Pakistan will always be a threat to the vulnerable and chaotic/autocratic regimes in Afghanistan and Iran with significant Pashtun and Baloch populations respectively. A Pakistan with harmonious Pashtun and Baloch populations will ensure that if a state arises when the regions’ borders need to be redrawn, the process could be completed with least fragmentation ensuring lesser chaos and more control.
The key of course will be loosening the federation to strengthen it further and to ensure continuation of a representative regime from federal level till the very grassroots. There is a lot between the cup and the lip, but the journey to the lip might have just begun.
Note: This in no way is a prediction of expansionist glorification of Pakistan. In fact, it is just an insight into one of the possibilities that might unleash around us. This is one of the many permutations in the entire probability set. So should be analyzed and explored further but should not be turned into any expansionist schizophrenic ideology.
Comments
There is no electricity and water and these guys are fighting expensive wargames.