Understanding Pakistan Army
A few months ago, mostly accidentally, I happened to meet a few officers of Pakistan Army who have served in South Waziristan and other areas of FATA, the epicenter of war on terror. What I heard from them made me explore Army's view on War on Terror further. Coincidently, my inquiry into Army's view on War on Terror coincided with killing of Osama Bin Laden. An incident that has put spotlight on Army's role in War on Terror and its allegiances in the war like never before.
On the onset, let me make a few things clear. My opposition to Pakistan Army's strategic doctrine and its repeated interventions in political system is well known. I think Army made a mess of itself and of the country when it assumed the role of national savior, policy-maker, a and custodian of a pseudo doctrine of "Nazriya-e-Pakistan". Neither was it helpful for anyone but Army men, when the institute, which should have been a symbol of national pride, turned into a corporate machinery having wings from FMCG to Real Estate. Actions damaged Army's reputation and its image in public. The actions also led to creation of monsters which we and Army are fighting to date.
Having these opinions about Army and being ultra-critical of Army, I still think that Army needs to be reformed not destroyed and if Army or some in it want to take the course of reform, they should be encouraged rather than being taunted for their past follies. If world has to have a chance at dealing with the menace of terrorism in Middle East and Central Asia, the best route goes through Pakistan Army. It is imperative for the world not to let go on this best route. But in the light of events of May 2, the onus now is more on Pakistan Army to show to the world that it is ready to pursue the task with clarity of purpose and single-mindedness.
So what is Army's view on WoT? To be honest, based on my inquiries and interviews, it is confused. But in this confusion lies some arrays of hope. First and foremost, any number of soldiers I talked to who have served in FATA areas or Swat have nothing but remorse for terrorists. They feel that eliminating these terrorists is the only solution to deal with the menace.
Secondly, talking to many a people who have been involved in planning at the middle-tier there's one recurring theme. We realize that we are in a mess. We have been with the terrorists for more than three decades. Now, in the process of detachment, we cannot abandon all of them outrightly. Our best approach is to divide them and have some on our side when we deal with the rest. About Haqqani network, they also say that what Americans fail to realize is that we need Haqqani on our side for this is essential to our control in an otherwise wild FATA.
Talking to most of the people who had been involved with WoT, one also finds a recurring theme that we need Americans and they need us to fight this mess. Without us, they cannot control Afghanistan and without the help of their technology and intelligence-sharing we cannot control our maniacs. Though the need for cooperation is well realized, there exists an element of distrust as well. Army feels that US is covertly supporting some of the terror organizations linked with TTP to pressurize Army and create a counterbalance for Haqqani Network's activities in Afghanistan. There also are hints of communicational and cultural issues between American and Pakistani mid-tier officials.
It seems that Army top leadership though fully aware of the threat of Islamists and fully realizing that we cannot part ways with US if the state has to survive, gives an impression of being Anti-American. The explanation is that this helps keep anti-American sentiment in check and will not let it turn into anti-State or anti-Army sentiment. Army, in particular, is afraid of backlash from Islamists with in the Army. There have been many (not majority but a sizable minority) in Army who outrightly refused to join WoT on ideological grounds. Another explanation is that approach of keeping a facade denies a wildcard entry to Americans in the arena of positive public perception in Pakistan, and having doubts about what Americans need in the region this is what Army thinks it should do. What Army fails to realize is that by creating this impression, it is letting itself side with the extremists, at least in public perception. This is only strengthening extremists rather than weakening them. Also, without clearly knowing where the Army stands, people (urban classes aligned with Army in particular) seem swayed to move to extremists. It is about time that Army openly and categorically declares its position on War on Terror and let the people of Pakistan know which side it is on. There can be a way to clearly define where our interest converges with US and where we have reservations. Army must declare the reality that working with US is in our national interest when we fight the existential threat to the state and the society.
Based on what I found, two things remain unchanged and unmoved in Army's perception. First is the sense of superiority and the sense that civilians are not capable of dealing with their affairs and affairs of policymaking and statecraft, and second is Army's tribal-age perception of Indian threat. What Army's planning also ignores is the immense potential the exercise of soft-power holds.
Aftermath of OBL death provides an opportunity for those of us who wish to reform Pakistan Army with an opportunity. It also offers an opportunity for people within the Army to do soul-searching and reinvent themselves. What we must realize in the process is that reforming an Army that has reached where it is as a result of events of past 6 decades cannot be an overnight process. We will have to patient, mindful of follies Army is capable of committing but also be generous in letting go past in the event of a genuine effort of reform. Forcing Army into humiliation is going to destroy all. First step should be Army's distancing from mercenaries it created itself. More than anyone, it is Army that should realize that for a functioning state the first step is to create state's monopoly on use of violence. Second and third logical steps will be more civilian control over Army and strategy-making, and having a realistic world and security-vision inline with the realities around us more of which will be based on economic and not military considerations.
Army cannot continue this path created on delusional world view and a knee-jerk reactionary approach. For nation and for itself, it will have to reform. Good thing is, there are signs.
On the onset, let me make a few things clear. My opposition to Pakistan Army's strategic doctrine and its repeated interventions in political system is well known. I think Army made a mess of itself and of the country when it assumed the role of national savior, policy-maker, a and custodian of a pseudo doctrine of "Nazriya-e-Pakistan". Neither was it helpful for anyone but Army men, when the institute, which should have been a symbol of national pride, turned into a corporate machinery having wings from FMCG to Real Estate. Actions damaged Army's reputation and its image in public. The actions also led to creation of monsters which we and Army are fighting to date.
Having these opinions about Army and being ultra-critical of Army, I still think that Army needs to be reformed not destroyed and if Army or some in it want to take the course of reform, they should be encouraged rather than being taunted for their past follies. If world has to have a chance at dealing with the menace of terrorism in Middle East and Central Asia, the best route goes through Pakistan Army. It is imperative for the world not to let go on this best route. But in the light of events of May 2, the onus now is more on Pakistan Army to show to the world that it is ready to pursue the task with clarity of purpose and single-mindedness.
So what is Army's view on WoT? To be honest, based on my inquiries and interviews, it is confused. But in this confusion lies some arrays of hope. First and foremost, any number of soldiers I talked to who have served in FATA areas or Swat have nothing but remorse for terrorists. They feel that eliminating these terrorists is the only solution to deal with the menace.
Secondly, talking to many a people who have been involved in planning at the middle-tier there's one recurring theme. We realize that we are in a mess. We have been with the terrorists for more than three decades. Now, in the process of detachment, we cannot abandon all of them outrightly. Our best approach is to divide them and have some on our side when we deal with the rest. About Haqqani network, they also say that what Americans fail to realize is that we need Haqqani on our side for this is essential to our control in an otherwise wild FATA.
Talking to most of the people who had been involved with WoT, one also finds a recurring theme that we need Americans and they need us to fight this mess. Without us, they cannot control Afghanistan and without the help of their technology and intelligence-sharing we cannot control our maniacs. Though the need for cooperation is well realized, there exists an element of distrust as well. Army feels that US is covertly supporting some of the terror organizations linked with TTP to pressurize Army and create a counterbalance for Haqqani Network's activities in Afghanistan. There also are hints of communicational and cultural issues between American and Pakistani mid-tier officials.
It seems that Army top leadership though fully aware of the threat of Islamists and fully realizing that we cannot part ways with US if the state has to survive, gives an impression of being Anti-American. The explanation is that this helps keep anti-American sentiment in check and will not let it turn into anti-State or anti-Army sentiment. Army, in particular, is afraid of backlash from Islamists with in the Army. There have been many (not majority but a sizable minority) in Army who outrightly refused to join WoT on ideological grounds. Another explanation is that approach of keeping a facade denies a wildcard entry to Americans in the arena of positive public perception in Pakistan, and having doubts about what Americans need in the region this is what Army thinks it should do. What Army fails to realize is that by creating this impression, it is letting itself side with the extremists, at least in public perception. This is only strengthening extremists rather than weakening them. Also, without clearly knowing where the Army stands, people (urban classes aligned with Army in particular) seem swayed to move to extremists. It is about time that Army openly and categorically declares its position on War on Terror and let the people of Pakistan know which side it is on. There can be a way to clearly define where our interest converges with US and where we have reservations. Army must declare the reality that working with US is in our national interest when we fight the existential threat to the state and the society.
Based on what I found, two things remain unchanged and unmoved in Army's perception. First is the sense of superiority and the sense that civilians are not capable of dealing with their affairs and affairs of policymaking and statecraft, and second is Army's tribal-age perception of Indian threat. What Army's planning also ignores is the immense potential the exercise of soft-power holds.
Aftermath of OBL death provides an opportunity for those of us who wish to reform Pakistan Army with an opportunity. It also offers an opportunity for people within the Army to do soul-searching and reinvent themselves. What we must realize in the process is that reforming an Army that has reached where it is as a result of events of past 6 decades cannot be an overnight process. We will have to patient, mindful of follies Army is capable of committing but also be generous in letting go past in the event of a genuine effort of reform. Forcing Army into humiliation is going to destroy all. First step should be Army's distancing from mercenaries it created itself. More than anyone, it is Army that should realize that for a functioning state the first step is to create state's monopoly on use of violence. Second and third logical steps will be more civilian control over Army and strategy-making, and having a realistic world and security-vision inline with the realities around us more of which will be based on economic and not military considerations.
Army cannot continue this path created on delusional world view and a knee-jerk reactionary approach. For nation and for itself, it will have to reform. Good thing is, there are signs.
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