On Opposition to Kerry Lugar Bill and Other Emotional Exploitation in the name of Anti-Americanism


Below is complete text of Kerry Lugar Bill. The fuss about the bill has been that it's a sellout of national interest to US. I don't think anyone criticizing the bill has actually read this bill. So I invite the readers to read this bill before commenting on it.

First and foremost, the civilian aid has no strings attached to it. The only conditions are on military aid (which is not part of $ 1.5 billion/ yr). Even these strings are far from sellout that our right-wing fundo toddies are bound on telling us.

What are the conditions? In Section VI of the bill they are stated as:
    (c) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a certification to the appropriate congressional committees by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, that the security forces of Pakistan--
      (1) are making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan;
      (2) are making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban and associated militant groups from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and
      (3) are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
Now I can understand, like anyone else, what is pinching these toddies the most. It's the 3rd clause which emphasizes US's support for constitutional process in Pakistan. These toddies (rightly called as Syapa Group by Abbas Athar) have always thrived on such military interventions in the past. So, it makes sense that it hurts them. But for people of Pakistan, nuclear non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, ensuring that Pakistan's territory is not used for attacks in neighboring countries (including China and Central Asian states which had such complaints in last 20 years), and a commitment of USA to democracy in Pakistan are all issues of consensus.

It is just that the forces of regression, whose seed was sowed in our land by Mododi's philosophy and which have infiltrated deep in our media and academia under the patronage of various military regimes (most in Zia-Ul-Haq's) are bound on putting Pakistan on path of confrontation with not only United States but everything that stands for modern world. These Majid Nizamis, Hamid Guls and Jamat-I-Islamis and their prodigies in political classes, judiciary, media, business community and academia have thrived on this isolation of Pakistan. Ghairat, hamiyat, khudmukhtari etc are emotional catch phrases whose repeated utterance in media arouses the educated classes of Punjab and with out looking at the facts and applying their brains to analyze issues, they fall for the cliches so cleverly created by the Mododi's media in Pakistan.

There first argument was the government wouldn't succeed in getting the aid. When it became eminent that this wouldn't be the case, the line was that because of the credibility of the government, no direct aid will be given to the civilian government. In the actual bill, there is complete trust on political government. In fact, reading it will give you a sense that all the conditions are a clear indication that the mistrust US has is on civilian and military bureaucracy of Pakistan and so it wants to make sure that the constitutional process continues for the proper disbursement of this aid to Pakistanis. So now anokha ladlas had no option but to call this bill a sell out and flare the anti-US sentiments among people of Pakistan.

This misled and deceitful exploitation of emotions is not limited to Aid alone. Another instance of such misleading Anti-US propaganda can be seen in opposition to Drone Attacks. All the hue and cry on drone attacks comes from Punjab or Mullah elements of Pashtun areas. It is claimed that these attacks are a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. This is something which again is an arousing argument repeated time and again on media and has resonance with urban educated classes of Punjab. Here is the other, and I think more clearer side, of the picture. Drone attacks take place in areas on which Pakistan has lost control and are made against elements who have declared themselves to be enemies of Pakistan and have taken responsibility of attacks inside Pakistan. Now, what should I call these Hamid Mirs, Ansar Abbasis, and Imran Khans opposing these drone attacks, if not 5th columnists. For just like when Allied Forces were fighting Nazis to free France, the Hamid Mirs of France (the 5th columnists) were saying that Allied Forces are violating the sovereignty of France. This is the level of absurdity of this Anti-US campaign carried out by Mododi media and accepted by the urban educated classes of Lahore and Islamabad.

Yes we need to thrive for economic self reliance but this is something that the government cannot do. No govt. in the world has done this for its citizens. This is something that the society and its entrepreneurial spirits does. So my countrymen let us join hands to revive that entrepreneurial spirit in our land rather than taking this anti-American bait of inaction. Till then our friends across the world are trying to help us, so let us accept their help on terms that are more in our best interest than theirs.

Instead of wasting our anger at Anti-US sentiments flared up by Mododi media, let us focus on ensuring that we put pressure on our government to take to task the supporters and inciters of terrorism in our society including TV anchors, political leaders and scholars. This is a war of our survival in which our men, women and children are losing their lives day in day out. It is not America's war. It's our own war since late 70s when these monsters started blowing our mosques and markets. We have to fight it for our survival and we need to combat everyone who is on their side with word or with sword.

To the Mododites, the time for a modern, democratic and liberal Pakistan walking side by side international community towards prosperity is here. Join us wholeheartedly or you will be left out.


S.962

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the `Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
      (1) The people of Pakistan and the United States have a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.
      (2) In February 2008, the people of Pakistan elected a civilian government, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over governance and their own democratic reform and political development.
      (3) A democratic, moderate, modernizing Pakistan would represent the wishes of the Pakistani people and serve as a model to other countries around the world.
      (4) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with over 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of 2 percent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.
      (5) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.
      (6) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past 7 years.
      (7) Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more al Qaeda terrorist suspects have been apprehended in Pakistan than in any other country, including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
      (8) Despite the sacrifices and cooperation of the security forces of Pakistan, the top leadership of al Qaeda, as well as the leadership and rank-and-file of affiliated terrorist groups, are believed to be using Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan as a haven and a base from which to organize terrorist actions in Pakistan and globally, including--
        (A) attacks outside of Pakistan that have been attributed to groups with Pakistani connections, including--
          (i) the suicide car bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, which killed 58 people on June 7, 2008; and
          (ii) the massacre of approximately 165 people in Mumbai, India, including 6 United States citizens, in late November 2008; and
        (B) attacks within Pakistan, including--
          (i) an attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore on March 3, 2009;
          (ii) an attack at the Marriott hotel in Islamabad on September 9, 2008;
          (iii) the bombing of a political rally in Karachi on October 18, 2007;
          (iv) the targeting and killing of dozens of tribal, provincial, and national holders of political office;
          (v) an attack by gunfire on the U.S. Principal Officer in Peshawar in August 2008; and
          (vi) the brazen assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007.
      (9) In the 12-month period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, Pakistan's security forces have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency that has spread from FATA into settled areas, including the Swat Valley and other parts of NWFP and Balochistan. This struggle has taken the lives of more than 1,500 police and military personnel and left more than 3,000 wounded.
      (10) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, `Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan.'.
      (11) According to a Government Accountability Office Report (GAO-08-622), `since 2003, the administration's national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA' and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 22 U.S.C. 2656f note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53; 22 U.S.C. 2375 note).
      (12) In the past year, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with two-thirds of the population living on less than $2 a day and one-fifth of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program.
      (13) The people of Pakistan and the United States share many compatible goals, including--
        (A) combating terrorism and violent radicalism, both inside Pakistan and elsewhere;
        (B) solidifying democracy and the rule of law in Pakistan;
        (C) promoting the economic development of Pakistan, both through the building of infrastructure and the facilitation of increased trade;
        (D) promoting the social and material well-being of Pakistani citizens, particularly through development of such basic services as public education, access to potable water, and medical treatment; and
        (E) safeguarding the peace and security of South Asia, including by facilitating peaceful relations between Pakistan and its neighbors.
      (14) According to consistent opinion research, including that of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (December 28, 2007) and the International Republican Institute (January 29, 2008), many people in Pakistan have historically viewed the relationship between the United States and Pakistan as a transactional one, characterized by a heavy emphasis on security issues with little attention to other matters of great interest to citizens of Pakistan.
      (15) The election of a civilian government in Pakistan in February 2008 provides an opportunity, after nearly a decade of military-dominated rule, to place relations between Pakistan and the United States on a new and more stable foundation.
      (16) Both the Government of Pakistan and the United States Government should seek to enhance the bilateral relationship through additional multi-faceted engagement in order to strengthen the foundation for a consistent and reliable long-term partnership between the two countries.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
      (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
      (2) COUNTERINSURGENCY- The term `counterinsurgency' means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan through violent means.
      (3) COUNTERTERRORISM- The term `counterterrorism' means efforts to combat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), or other individuals and entities engaged in terrorist activity or support for such activity.
      (4) FATA- The term `FATA' means the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
      (5) NWFP- The term `NWFP' means the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial capital.
      (6) PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS- The term `Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas' includes the Pakistan regions known as NWFP, FATA, and parts of Balochistan in which the Taliban or Al Qaeda have traditionally found refuge.
      (7) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE- The term `security-related assistance' means--
        (A) grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763);
        (B) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.);
        (C) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.);
        (D) any equipment, supplies, and training provided pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3456); and
        (E) any equipment, supplies, and training provided pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181; 122 Stat. 368).
      (8) SECURITY FORCES OF PAKISTAN- The term `security forces of Pakistan' means the military and intelligence services of the Government of Pakistan, including the Armed Forces, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Bureau, police forces, levies, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary.
      (9) MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- The term `major defense equipment' has the meaning given in section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794(6)).

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
      (1) to support the consolidation of democracy, good governance, and rule of law in Pakistan;
      (2) to support economic growth and development in order to promote stability and security across Pakistan;
      (3) to affirm and build a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship with Pakistan;
      (4) to further the sustainable economic development of Pakistan and the improvement of the living conditions of its citizens, including in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, by expanding United States bilateral engagement with the Government of Pakistan, especially in areas of direct interest and importance to the daily lives of the people of Pakistan;
      (5) to work with Pakistan and the countries bordering Pakistan to facilitate peace in the region and harmonious relations between the countries of the region;
      (6) to work with the Government of Pakistan to prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, or elsewhere in the world;
      (7) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate military, paramilitary, and police action against terrorist targets;
      (8) to work with the Government of Pakistan to help bring peace, stability, and development to all regions of Pakistan, especially those in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, including support for an effective counterinsurgency strategy;
      (9) to expand people-to-people engagement between the United States and Pakistan, through increased educational, technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;
      (10) to encourage and promote public-private partnerships in Pakistan in order to bolster ongoing development efforts and strengthen economic prospects, especially with respect to opportunities to build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan; and
      (11) to encourage the development of local analytical capacity to measure progress on an integrated basis across the areas of donor country expenditure in Pakistan, and better hold the Government of Pakistan accountable for how the funds are being spent.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS.

    (a) Authorization- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the following amounts:
      (1) For fiscal year 2009, up to $1,500,000,000.
      (2) For fiscal year 2010, up to $1,500,000,000.
      (3) For fiscal year 2011, up to $1,500,000,000.
      (4) For fiscal year 2012, up to $1,500,000,000.
      (5) For fiscal year 2013, up to $1,500,000,000.
    (b) Availability of Funds-
      (1) IN GENERAL- Of the funds appropriated in each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a)--
        (A) none of the amounts appropriated may be made available after the date of the enactment of this Act for assistance to Pakistan unless the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with subsection (j); and
        (B) not more than $750,000,000 may be made available for assistance to Pakistan in any fiscal year after 2009 unless the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits to the appropriate congressional committees during that fiscal year--
          (i) a certification that assistance provided to Pakistan under this Act to date has made or is making substantial progress toward achieving the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to subsection (j)(1); and
          (ii) a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification described in clause (i).
      (2) MAKER OF CERTIFICATION- In the event of a vacancy in, or the termination of, the position of the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the certification described under paragraph (1)(B) may be made by the Secretary of State.
    (c) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to provide such waiver.
    (d) Sense of Congress on Foreign Assistance Funds- It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to $1,500,000,000 per year for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for the purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
    (e) Sense of Congress on Security-related Assistance- It is the sense of Congress that security-related assistance to the Government of Pakistan--
      (1) should be provided in close coordination with the Government of Pakistan, designed to improve the Government's capabilities in areas of mutual concern, and maintained at a level that will bring significant gains in pursuing the policies set forth in paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) of section 4; and
      (2) should be geared primarily toward bolstering the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Government to effectively defeat the Taliban-backed insurgency and deny popular support to al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are based in Pakistan.
    (f) Use of Funds-
      (1) IN GENERAL- Funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be used for projects intended to benefit the people of Pakistan, including projects that promote--
        (A) just and democratic governance, including--
          (i) police reform, equipping, and training;
          (ii) independent, efficient, and effective judicial systems;
          (iii) political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law;
          (iv) respect for human and civil rights and the promotion of an independent media;
          (v) transparency and accountability of all branches of government and judicial proceedings;
          (vi) anticorruption efforts among bureaucrats, elected officials, and public servants at all levels of military and civilian government administration;
          (vii) countering the narcotics trade; and
          (viii) the implementation of legal and political reforms in the FATA;
        (B) economic freedom, including--
          (i) sustainable economic growth, including in rural areas, and the sustainable management of natural resources;
          (ii) investments in energy and water, including energy generation and cross-border infrastructure projects with Afghanistan;
          (iii) employment generation, including essential basic infrastructure projects such as roads and irrigation projects and other physical infrastructure; and
          (iv) worker rights, including the right to form labor unions and legally enforce provisions safeguarding the rights of workers and local community stakeholders;
        (C) investments in people, particularly women and children, including--
          (i) broad-based public primary and secondary education and vocational training for both boys and girls;
          (ii) food security and agricultural development to ensure food staples and other crops that provide economic growth and income opportunities in times of severe shortage;
          (iii) quality public health, including medical clinics with well trained staff serving rural and urban communities;
          (iv) vocational training for women and access to microfinance for small business establishment and income generation for women; and
          (v) higher education to ensure a breadth and consistency of Pakistani graduates to prepare citizens to help strengthen the foundation for improved governance and economic vitality, including through public-private partnerships; and
        (D) long-term development in regions of Pakistan where internal conflict has caused large-scale displacement.
      (2) FUNDING FOR POLICE REFORM, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING- Up to $100,000,000 of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) should be used for police reform, equipping, and training.
    (g) Preference for Building Local Capacity- The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contacts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.
    (h) Authority To Use Funds for Operational and Audit Expenses-
      (1) IN GENERAL- Of the amounts appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a)--
        (A) up to $10,000,000 may be used for administrative expenses of Federal departments and agencies in connection with the provision of assistance authorized by this section;
        (B) up to $30,000,000 may be made available to the Inspectors General of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and other relevant Executive branch agencies in order to provide audits and program reviews of projects funded pursuant to this section; and
(C) up to $5,000,000 may be used by the Secretary to establish a Chief of Mission Fund for use by the Chief of Mission in Pakistan to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.

SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Limitation on Certain Military Assistance- Beginning in fiscal year 2010, no grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and no assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State makes the certification required under subsection (c).
    (b) Limitation on Arms Transfers- Beginning in fiscal year 2012, no letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State makes the certification required under subsection (c).
    (c) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a certification to the appropriate congressional committees by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, that the security forces of Pakistan--
      (1) are making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan;
      (2) are making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban and associated militant groups from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and
      (3) are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
    (d) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsections (a) and (b) if the Secretary determines it is important to the national security interests of the United States to provide such waiver.
    (e) Prior Notice of Waiver- A waiver pursuant to subsection (d) may not be exercised until 15 days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees written notice of the intent to issue such waiver and the reasons therefor. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
    (f) Annual Report- The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report on the progress of the security forces of Pakistan in satisfying the requirements enumerated in subsection (c). The Secretary of State shall establish detailed, specific requirements and metrics for evaluating the progress in satisfying these requirements and apply these requirements and metrics consistently in each annual report. This report may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
      (1) Coalition Support Funds are critical components of the global fight against terrorism, and in Pakistan provide essential support for--
        (A) military operations of the Government of Pakistan to destroy the terrorist threat and close the terrorist safe haven, known or suspected, in the FATA, the NWFP, and other regions of Pakistan; and
        (B) military operations of the Government of Pakistan to protect United States and allied logistic operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan;
      (2) despite the broad discretion Congress granted the Secretary of Defense in terms of managing Coalition Support Funds, the Pakistan reimbursement claims process for Coalition Support Funds requires increased oversight and accountability, consistent with the conclusions of the June 2008 report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-806);
      (3) in order to ensure that this significant United States effort in support of countering terrorism in Pakistan effectively ensures the intended use of Coalition Support Funds, and to avoid redundancy in other security assistance programs, such as Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales, more specific guidance should be generated, and accountability delineated, for officials associated with oversight of this program within the United States Embassy in Pakistan, the United States Central Command, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of Management and Budget; and
      (4) the Secretary of Defense should submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a semiannual report on the use of Coalition Support Funds, which may be submitted in classified or unclassified form as necessary.

SEC. 8. PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER AREAS STRATEGY.

    (a) Development of Comprehensive Strategy- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and such other government officials as may be appropriate, shall develop a comprehensive, cross-border strategy that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, humanitarian, law enforcement support, and strategic communications and information technology--for working with the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, NATO, and other like-minded allies to best implement effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measurers in and near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.
    (b) Report- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed description of a comprehensive strategy for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas containing the elements specified in subsection (a) and proposed timelines and budgets for implementing the strategy.

SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
      (1) recognize the bold political steps the Pakistan electorate has taken during a time of heightened sensitivity and tension in 2007 and 2008 to elect a new civilian government, as well as the continued quest for good governance and the rule of law under the elected government in 2008 and 2009;
      (2) seize this strategic opportunity in the interests of Pakistan as well as in the national security interests of the United States to expand its engagement with the Government and people of Pakistan in areas of particular interest and importance to the people of Pakistan;
      (3) continue to build a responsible and reciprocal security relationship taking into account the national security interests of the United States as well as regional and national dynamics in Pakistan to further strengthen and enable the position of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally;
      (4) seek ways to strengthen our countries' mutual understanding and promote greater insight and knowledge of each other's social, cultural and historical diversity through personnel exchanges and support for the establishment of institutions of higher learning with international accreditation; and
      (5) explore means to consult with and utilize the relevant expertise and skills of the Pakistani-American community.

SEC. 10. TERM OF YEARS.

    With the exception of subsections (b)(1)(B), (j), (k), and (l) of section 5, this Act shall remain in force after September 30, 2013.

Passed the Senate June 24, 2009.

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