Pakistan Army - A Need to Change the National Security Doctrine
We live in a world that sits on the brink of a world war. Never has there been more volatility in the world since early twentieth century. The volatility is of the magnitude that gave birth to two world wars and ended with the emergence of a new global order of post-colonial era.
Of a few possible flash points of this imminent conflict, the most serious are Af-Pak and Indo-Pak issues. Pakistan Army, marred by a series of internal and external changes on ground, has to take this factor into their calculation when they devise any strategy in their bid to hold on to the absolute power, they have enjoyed in Pakistan in last five decades.
Army in part created and in part allied with conservative fundamentalist elements who drew their strength from either religion or a perceived Ideology of Pakistan or a combination of both. It had done this historically against a strong liberal leftist movement, having special attraction among poor and among people of smaller provinces. In fact, Pakistan Army served as a gun to protect and ensure protected economy where certain classes, within and outside Army, thrived on a system of perks and privileges granted by the state.
Initially, it was Army through whom the derived their power. However, with time the conservative elements gained enough strength to become a force to reckon with. Thus started the infighting between the establishment of Pakistan on many fronts. On one level, Nawaz Sharif's fight with Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Asif Nawaz and ultimately Pervez Musharraf was a manifestation of this infighting amongst the ruling establishment of Pakistan. On another level, the fight between fundamentalist elements and Pakistan Army, especially in the backdrop of Lal Masjid Operation reflects this infighting.
Things have reached a point where in the triangle of Army, conservative elements and liberal democratic Pakistan, Army needs to ally with one of the two remaining elements to survive. Army realizes that the existential threat to all things Pakistani, including Army, comes from the conservative base who are not only fighting an armed war against the state but have penetrated into country’s bureaucracy, judiciary, media and even Army itself. This ideology has no room for an Armed Force modeled on British Military practices. If and when these forces triumph, the Army, just like all the other institutions, will be among the targets of these forces. Unfortunately, in the wake of this eminent threat that has weakened but not subsided, the debate within the Army seems to be stemming from the ideological beliefs of individuals, a strong sense of xenophobia, and a world view that has been proven wrong many times in last 7 years. Sometimes it seems as though the same elements are shaping/reshaping the debate within the Army. Army needs to weigh her options carefully and figure out how best to protect its power from complete erosion in Pakistan.
What Army needs to realize is that the near-collapse Pakistan was facing in 2007-08 was not because of one man. It was the result of an ideology and policy that spans more than 4 decades. It is through a series of surgical and cosmetic initiatives that The State of Pakistan has recovered a bit from abyss. Resorting to the same policies and embracing the same ideology will lead to similar consequences.
For now, Army seems bound to cut to size the present democratic setup. For this, it will need full support of PML-N, a conservative political party with substantial sympathy for Taliban and other hard-line organizations, along with covert support of outfits like JI, Tehrik-i-Insaaf etc who are open in their support for militants. This move is likely to strengthen these elements. The question both sides need to ask themselves is what will happen once PPP is out of picture. A rational analysis on part of Army is lacking as to whether it is better of letting the present setup work, root out the conservative challenge to its hegemony and to the state of Pakistan of which Army is the biggest stakeholder or to side with conservatives, root out the present setup and then settle score with conservative elements. In latter, Army will not have the much needed backing of liberal political forces, especially PPP, which was instrumental in Swat operation and other such gains Army has made against militants. Where things stand right now, it seems highly unlikely that Army will succeed in ensuring that it is not subservient to some other element in the new power equation. The question is whether it decides to be subservient to conservatives or to a genuine democratic setup.
In an impulsive thought process, one distant probability could be that Army, sensing the change in global power balance, is biding time by ensuing chaos through collaborating with fundamentalists. The only drawback of this approach is that once things reach the tipping point in chaos, they do not remain in control of anyone. Even if successful, the end result of this approach seems more likely to be advantage fundamentalists rather than advantage Pakistan Army. If the calculation is that the political conservatives Army is planning to ally with will be able to compensate for the popular support of the present setup, it seems unlikely. The political forces it is planning to align with will lose bulk of their support base the moment they start siding with Army against militants. Where will N or TI derive support if it becomes a part of a pro-US armed assault? And how can JI support any assault of armed militants?
To start with, this approach of siding with conservatives is not sustainable because of international considerations. Just when US and allies are willing to offer reward for Taliban who might renounce their previous ideology and are willing to accommodate Pashtuns in any permanent Afghan setup, it will be naive to assume that they are going to let go Afghanistan any time soon or are going to agree to a pre-9/11 status quo in the region. This is the biggest factor being overlooked by Pakistan Army in their strategic calculations. If history is anything to go by, Pakistan Army has time and again failed to realize the geo-political realities of the region and to come up with a practical strategic roadmap for the institution as well as the country and it seems this time its calculations are no different.
Army might be thinking that because of its vitality in the region, as has been the case in the past, US will tolerate any of Army's misadventures in the domestic political scenario of Pakistan. In my humble opinion, post 9/11, US has not spent US$ 2.1 trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq to agree to a status quo. It seems evident that greater civilian control through elected representatives in Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon (the buffer states between the modern world and the Middle East) remains cornerstone of US/West’s policy in the new world order. My fear is that if Army pushes too far against the democratic setup and present regime, it will have to face a very sharp response from international community. In this course of conflict, the day will be very unfortunate for Pakistan when international forces warn Pakistan's Security Apparatus to ensure the physical safety of President of Pakistan.
Army might be hoping that in any open conflict with West, China or KSA will come to their aid. In case of China, this assertion has been proven wrong time and again in recent times (most notably Kargil and situation emerging after attack on Indian Parliament). Also, China is apprehensive of growing militancy and rise of conservative elements in Pakistan and considers it a destabilizing factor in its western areas. As for Saudi Arabia, it does not have enough clout to pull such Anti-US venture through in a region like Af-Pak.
No matter how one sees it, short of an all out chaos, Army's best option is to agree to a subservient role to the civilian setup and sit with the civilian govt. to layout parameters for national security doctrine ensuring the preservation of Army's clout to the degree it can be protected and ensuring that Pakistan's vital interests vis-a-vis India, Nuclear Program, and economic affairs are safeguarded. If Army's concerns are these issues, I am hopeful that civilian setup and Army can reach a consensus. If Army wants to assert itself as the dominant player in policy making and national politics, then I am afraid the days for it are numbered. In that case, Army must be ready to face the monster, the conservatives in this country are. I would recommend that this is high time that an informal think-tank should be established comprising sane heads from all political parties in parliament and of notable national security professionals and analysts to analyze the security, foreign affairs and defense affairs. The forum should debate openly all the issues confronting Pakistan’s national security and discuss possible courses of action without the fear of being labeled unpatriotic etc. The aim should be to come up with bare-minimum consensus on key national security issues san hypocrisy in light of emerging global realities. It is time to be true to ourselves rather than being marred by a world view created in utopia. Without it our survival seems at stake.
Of a few possible flash points of this imminent conflict, the most serious are Af-Pak and Indo-Pak issues. Pakistan Army, marred by a series of internal and external changes on ground, has to take this factor into their calculation when they devise any strategy in their bid to hold on to the absolute power, they have enjoyed in Pakistan in last five decades.
Army in part created and in part allied with conservative fundamentalist elements who drew their strength from either religion or a perceived Ideology of Pakistan or a combination of both. It had done this historically against a strong liberal leftist movement, having special attraction among poor and among people of smaller provinces. In fact, Pakistan Army served as a gun to protect and ensure protected economy where certain classes, within and outside Army, thrived on a system of perks and privileges granted by the state.
Initially, it was Army through whom the derived their power. However, with time the conservative elements gained enough strength to become a force to reckon with. Thus started the infighting between the establishment of Pakistan on many fronts. On one level, Nawaz Sharif's fight with Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Asif Nawaz and ultimately Pervez Musharraf was a manifestation of this infighting amongst the ruling establishment of Pakistan. On another level, the fight between fundamentalist elements and Pakistan Army, especially in the backdrop of Lal Masjid Operation reflects this infighting.
Things have reached a point where in the triangle of Army, conservative elements and liberal democratic Pakistan, Army needs to ally with one of the two remaining elements to survive. Army realizes that the existential threat to all things Pakistani, including Army, comes from the conservative base who are not only fighting an armed war against the state but have penetrated into country’s bureaucracy, judiciary, media and even Army itself. This ideology has no room for an Armed Force modeled on British Military practices. If and when these forces triumph, the Army, just like all the other institutions, will be among the targets of these forces. Unfortunately, in the wake of this eminent threat that has weakened but not subsided, the debate within the Army seems to be stemming from the ideological beliefs of individuals, a strong sense of xenophobia, and a world view that has been proven wrong many times in last 7 years. Sometimes it seems as though the same elements are shaping/reshaping the debate within the Army. Army needs to weigh her options carefully and figure out how best to protect its power from complete erosion in Pakistan.
What Army needs to realize is that the near-collapse Pakistan was facing in 2007-08 was not because of one man. It was the result of an ideology and policy that spans more than 4 decades. It is through a series of surgical and cosmetic initiatives that The State of Pakistan has recovered a bit from abyss. Resorting to the same policies and embracing the same ideology will lead to similar consequences.
For now, Army seems bound to cut to size the present democratic setup. For this, it will need full support of PML-N, a conservative political party with substantial sympathy for Taliban and other hard-line organizations, along with covert support of outfits like JI, Tehrik-i-Insaaf etc who are open in their support for militants. This move is likely to strengthen these elements. The question both sides need to ask themselves is what will happen once PPP is out of picture. A rational analysis on part of Army is lacking as to whether it is better of letting the present setup work, root out the conservative challenge to its hegemony and to the state of Pakistan of which Army is the biggest stakeholder or to side with conservatives, root out the present setup and then settle score with conservative elements. In latter, Army will not have the much needed backing of liberal political forces, especially PPP, which was instrumental in Swat operation and other such gains Army has made against militants. Where things stand right now, it seems highly unlikely that Army will succeed in ensuring that it is not subservient to some other element in the new power equation. The question is whether it decides to be subservient to conservatives or to a genuine democratic setup.
In an impulsive thought process, one distant probability could be that Army, sensing the change in global power balance, is biding time by ensuing chaos through collaborating with fundamentalists. The only drawback of this approach is that once things reach the tipping point in chaos, they do not remain in control of anyone. Even if successful, the end result of this approach seems more likely to be advantage fundamentalists rather than advantage Pakistan Army. If the calculation is that the political conservatives Army is planning to ally with will be able to compensate for the popular support of the present setup, it seems unlikely. The political forces it is planning to align with will lose bulk of their support base the moment they start siding with Army against militants. Where will N or TI derive support if it becomes a part of a pro-US armed assault? And how can JI support any assault of armed militants?
To start with, this approach of siding with conservatives is not sustainable because of international considerations. Just when US and allies are willing to offer reward for Taliban who might renounce their previous ideology and are willing to accommodate Pashtuns in any permanent Afghan setup, it will be naive to assume that they are going to let go Afghanistan any time soon or are going to agree to a pre-9/11 status quo in the region. This is the biggest factor being overlooked by Pakistan Army in their strategic calculations. If history is anything to go by, Pakistan Army has time and again failed to realize the geo-political realities of the region and to come up with a practical strategic roadmap for the institution as well as the country and it seems this time its calculations are no different.
Army might be thinking that because of its vitality in the region, as has been the case in the past, US will tolerate any of Army's misadventures in the domestic political scenario of Pakistan. In my humble opinion, post 9/11, US has not spent US$ 2.1 trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq to agree to a status quo. It seems evident that greater civilian control through elected representatives in Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon (the buffer states between the modern world and the Middle East) remains cornerstone of US/West’s policy in the new world order. My fear is that if Army pushes too far against the democratic setup and present regime, it will have to face a very sharp response from international community. In this course of conflict, the day will be very unfortunate for Pakistan when international forces warn Pakistan's Security Apparatus to ensure the physical safety of President of Pakistan.
Army might be hoping that in any open conflict with West, China or KSA will come to their aid. In case of China, this assertion has been proven wrong time and again in recent times (most notably Kargil and situation emerging after attack on Indian Parliament). Also, China is apprehensive of growing militancy and rise of conservative elements in Pakistan and considers it a destabilizing factor in its western areas. As for Saudi Arabia, it does not have enough clout to pull such Anti-US venture through in a region like Af-Pak.
No matter how one sees it, short of an all out chaos, Army's best option is to agree to a subservient role to the civilian setup and sit with the civilian govt. to layout parameters for national security doctrine ensuring the preservation of Army's clout to the degree it can be protected and ensuring that Pakistan's vital interests vis-a-vis India, Nuclear Program, and economic affairs are safeguarded. If Army's concerns are these issues, I am hopeful that civilian setup and Army can reach a consensus. If Army wants to assert itself as the dominant player in policy making and national politics, then I am afraid the days for it are numbered. In that case, Army must be ready to face the monster, the conservatives in this country are. I would recommend that this is high time that an informal think-tank should be established comprising sane heads from all political parties in parliament and of notable national security professionals and analysts to analyze the security, foreign affairs and defense affairs. The forum should debate openly all the issues confronting Pakistan’s national security and discuss possible courses of action without the fear of being labeled unpatriotic etc. The aim should be to come up with bare-minimum consensus on key national security issues san hypocrisy in light of emerging global realities. It is time to be true to ourselves rather than being marred by a world view created in utopia. Without it our survival seems at stake.
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